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ABSTRACT 
 In August 2017, the forced mass migration of the Rohingya, a Muslim minority 
group in Myanmar, became world news after the country’s military began to drive 
thousands from their homes. Within months, an estimated 671,000 Rohingya had left the 
country, and today remain with over 200,000 previous refugees in overcrowded, 
underfunded camps in Bangladesh. 
 This thesis aims to investigate the root causes of Rohingya persecution by the 
government and military of Myanmar, the likelihood that this population will become 
radicalized, and possible solutions to the crisis. It uses a mixed method approach to 
examine these questions, including a qualitative look at the history of the Rohingya; 
visual analytic techniques to evaluate the international response to the 2017 Rohingya 
refugee crisis; and a game theoretic approach to better understand the possibility of a 
nonviolence solution that focuses on citizenship and regional autonomy for the Rohingya. 
 This thesis finds that the most recent wave of forced migration has placed the 
Rohingya at increased risk of radicalization and offers three recommendations for 
mitigating these risks: providing more international aid to sustain the refugees in 
Bangladesh; moving beyond simply repatriating the Rohingya; and creating incentives 
for Myanmar to recognize the Rohingya as citizens and give them greater autonomy in 
Rakhine State. 
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1 
I. BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM 
In August 2017, the mass migration of the Rohingya, a Muslim minority population 
in Myanmar (formerly Burma), became world news after the country’s military began to 
forcibly displace thousands from their homes. Within weeks, hundreds of thousands of 
Rohingya began spilling into Bangladesh seeking safety and recounting atrocities suffered 
at the hands of the Myanmar military. The Myanmar government blamed the forced 
migration on a fringe group, the self-styled Harakah al-Yaqin (HaY), or “Faith Movement,” 
which attacked multiple border checkpoints in the northern region of Rakhine State and 
killed 14 Myanmar security guards.1 Myanmar’s severe and disproportionate response 
prompted U.S. Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, to declare that, “the situation in northern 
Rakhine State constitutes ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya.”2 Despite the media 
coverage and condemnation from multiple countries and the United Nations (UN), this 
incident of forced migration was not new; the Rohingya in Myanmar have been the subject 
of multiple waves of government and military-led persecution. 
As of August 2018, the violence and mass migration has subsided, but over 900,000 
Rohingya remain in Bangladesh and are confined to camps along the Bangladesh-Myanmar 
border. Bilateral talks between Bangladesh and Myanmar, aided by international 
organizations, have attempted to begin the repatriation process. However, short of a long-
term solution to address the underlying causes of the mass migration, the cycle of violence 
and persecution will likely continue. 
Furthermore, the massive forced migration and protracted persecution of the 
Rohingya raises concerns about the potential for substantial radicalization of this group, 
especially in Bangladesh. In September 2017, during a UN Security Council session 
                                                 
 1 International Crisis Group, “Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis Enters a Dangerous New Phase,” Asia 
Report N°292 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, December 7, 2017), 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/292-myanmars-rohingya-crisis-enters-
dangerous-new-phase. 
2 Rex W. Tillerson, “Efforts to Address Burma’s Rakhine State Crisis,” U.S. Department of State 
(blog), November 22, 2017, 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20172018tillerson/remarks/2017/11/275848.htm. 
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discussing the Rohingya crisis, Antonio Guterres, the UN Secretary-General, warned that 
“the devastating humanitarian situation is not only a breeding ground for radicalization, it 
also puts vulnerable people–including young children–at risk of criminal elements 
including trafficking.”3 In response to the influx of refugees, Bangladesh increased security 
forces in the Cox’s Bazar district, and local officials expressed concern about the presence 
of insurgents intermingled with the refugees.4 
This thesis aims to investigate the factors and conditions that have caused the 
repeated incidents of forced migration of Rohingya and the likelihood that they may turn 
towards radicalization. Additionally, this thesis aims to investigate possible solutions that 
would mitigate the underlying issues and decrease the likelihood of future incidents of 
forced migration. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis aims to examine the following questions: What are the conditions that 
have caused the repeated incidents of forced migration of Rohingya from the country of 
Myanmar? Given the repeated incidents of discrimination and forced migration, what is 
the likelihood that the Muslim minority will turn towards radicalization? And, what are the 
conditions that would allow Myanmar and the Rohingya to reach an agreement that 
decreases the likelihood of future incidents of forced migration? 
B. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis aims to answer these questions through three different methods. First, it 
examines these questions through qualitative methods, specifically by providing a historic 
overview of the Rohingya, the state of Myanmar, and five waves of forced migration 
(1963–1967, 1971–1979, 1988–1992, 2012–2013, and 2016–2017). It identifies competing 
narratives between the Rohingya and the government of Myanmar over the origins of the 
                                                 
3 António Guterres, “Remarks at Open Debate of the Security Council on Myanmar,” United Nations, 
September 28, 2017, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2017-09-28/sgs-myanmar-remarks-
security-council. 




Rohingya and examines five major historical periods in Myanmar (pre-colonial, colonial, 
independence, authoritarian rule, and new democracy), with an emphasis on key events 
since Myanmar’s independence in 1948. 
Second, the thesis uses visual analytic techniques to display critical risk factors for 
radicalization, specifically analyzing the size and density of refugee camps in Bangladesh, 
the sources of financial donations to the Rohingya crisis, and mapping the international 
community’s inconsistent behavior regarding the crisis. The technique consolidates data 
from many fields to help identify relationships between various factors. 
Third, the thesis uses game theory to model the conflict between the Rohingya and 
the government of Myanmar to explore a way to achieve an agreement that could secure a 
lasting solution to the crisis. The thesis uses a sequential, two-person, partial conflict game 
with two strategies available to each player (violence or nonviolence) to model the conflict 
over Rohingya citizenship and regional autonomy in Rakhine State. From this game, the 
thesis identifies the need for a third-party guarantor to ensure cooperation from the players 
and applies an arbitration technique, known as the adjusted winner procedure, to fairly 
divide the contentious issue of citizenship between the two players. 
The thesis draws from scholarly journals, reports from international organizations, 
government documents, and secondary literature to investigate the history of the Rohingya 
and response to the 2016–2017 wave of persecution. 
C. FINDINGS 
This investigation yields three findings: First, an examination of the history of the 
Rohingya shows that their claimed origins and time of arrival in the region drastically differ 
from the belief held by the government of Myanmar. The Rohingya claim a pre-colonial 
history and a unique identity from neighboring Bangladeshis, despite sharing the same 
religion and speaking the same language. The government of Myanmar, by contrast, views 
the Rohingya as illegal immigrants brought in from Bangladesh by the British. This 
fundamental disagreement has contributed to the continued persecution of the Rohingya, 
including five waves of forced migration. 
4 
Second, drawing from a 2015 refugee radicalization assessment tool developed by 
the RAND Corporation, the thesis finds that the most recent wave of forced migration, 
which began in 2016, has placed the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh at an increased risk 
of future radicalization. Specifically, Bangladesh’s restrictive policies toward the 
Rohingya, limited humanitarian aid and funding, and the lack of pressure put on the 
government of Myanmar by regional and international actors are all factors that increase 
the risk of the Rohingya radicalizing. Additionally, the RAND framework notes that the 
duration of the crisis plays a critical role in the risk of radicalization. As of August 2018, 
the most recent crisis is entering its second year. The management of the Rohingya refugee 
crisis by Bangladesh and the international community is critical to reducing the likelihood 
of radicalization within the Rohingya population. 
Furthermore, a small group of Rohingya have already demonstrated a willingness 
to use violence to change the status quo, specifically through the emergence of the Arakan 
Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), formerly HaY. ARSA was largely blamed for 
instigating the 2016 wave of persecution against the Rohingya after perpetrating an attack 
against over 30 Myanmar border checkpoints and an army base. ARSA has conducted only 
a few operations since 2017, and its total organizational strength is unknown, but it has 
demonstrated a moderate level of organization and lethality that is worth watching. Despite 
the efforts of Bangladesh to increase security measures, there are signs that ARSA has 
developed a presence in the camps.5 While the fluid nature of the crisis has made measuring 
the presence of ARSA in the camps all but impossible, the 900,000 refugees in Bangladesh 
provide a vulnerable population in a fertile setting from which to recruit and grow the 
insurgent movement. Additionally, while ARSA has not adopted an overtly religious tone, 
                                                 
5 International Crisis Group, “The Long Haul Ahead for Myanmar’s Rohingya Refugee Crisis,” Asia 




the organization traces its origins to refugees in Saudi Arabia, and several Islamic clerics 
have issued fatwas (rulings by recognized Islamic authorities) that endorse their cause.6 
Third, a game theory approach finds that a resolution to the crisis is possible if both 
sides compromise on key issues, specifically the conditions for citizenship and regional 
autonomy for the Rohingya. However, a significant impediment to a compromise in this 
situation is that neither actor is unified. This is certainly the case with the Rohingya, who 
do not have a mechanism in place to express a singular opinion on an issue nor do they 
have someone who can represent their collective interests. Myanmar also does not speak 
with one voice; it is a nascent democracy with a civilian head of state; however, the military 
retains substantial autonomy and decision-making authority in its operations. 
D. OUTLINE OF THESIS 
The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter II examines the history of the Rohingya 
people, with an emphasis on the competing narratives regarding their origins and 
citizenship in Myanmar. The chapter underscores Myanmar’s unwillingness to 
recognize the Rohingya as an ethnic minority group and grant them citizenship as a critical 
driver of violence. The chapter identifies five waves of persecution of Rohingya by the 
government and military of Myanmar (1963–1967, 1971–1979, 1988–1992, 2012–2013, 
and 2016–2017). 
Chapter III uses a framework developed by the RAND Corporation for assessing 
the risk of refugee radicalization to investigate the likelihood of the Rohingya radicalizing 
in the most recent wave of forced migration, which began in 2016. The chapter then uses 
three variables—host country policies, financial support, and statements from the 
international community—to analyze the effect that the international response is having on 
reducing the likelihood of radicalization amongst the Rohingya. Using visual analytics, the 
chapter highlights the camp locations and density, funding sources from regional and 
international actors, and their public statements regarding the crisis. The chapter finds that 
                                                 
6 International Crisis Group, “Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State,” Asia Report 




Bangladesh has created restrictive laws toward the Rohingya refugee population, 
humanitarian relief efforts are underfunded, and most governments continue to maintain 
economic ties with Myanmar, allowing the government and military to continue its 
discriminatory policies and actions against the Rohingya. All of these factors put the 
Rohingya at risk for radicalization. 
Chapter IV models the Rohingya conflict using game theory, specifically a two-
person, partial conflict game, and finds that both players—the Rohingya and the 
government of Myanmar (including its military)—can maximize their payoff through 
mutual nonviolence. The chapter introduces and applies an arbitration technique, known 
as the adjusted winner procedure, to fairly divide the contentious issues between the two 
players and secure a mutually beneficial outcome. This payoff, however, requires a mutual 
“promise” not to pursue violence, which could be achieved through a negotiated agreement 
over the contentious issues, namely citizenship and regional autonomy for the Rohingya. 
Drawing from Chapter III, it identifies Japan, the UN, and the United States as possible 
third-party guarantors. 
Finally, Chapter V concludes by presenting findings and recommendations to end 
the persecution of the Rohingya and to prevent their future radicalization. Specifically, the 
chapter recommends that international financial aid to the crisis be sustained because it is 
a critical component of the response and shortfalls can increase the risk of radicalization. 
Furthermore, radicalization of the Rohingya is still possible, and the international 
community should ensure that underlying issues to the crisis are addressed or the Rohingya 
may resort to violence to change the status quo. Lastly, Bangladesh and the international 
community should pressure Myanmar to confer citizenship on the Rohingya; repatriation 
alone will likely lead to another round of violence. 
7 
II. HISTORIC OVERVIEW OF THE ROHINGYA 
In August 2017, the Rohingya became frontline news following a mass migration 
of an estimated 671,000 individuals from Rakhine State in Myanmar.7 However, this was 
not the first instance of forced migration by the government of Myanmar. Persecution and 
forced migration of the Rohingya has occurred in five distinct waves since Myanmar’s 
independence: as a result of economic policy from 1963–1967; during an aggressive census 
campaign from 1971–1979; as punishment for prodemocracy protests from 1988–1992; as 
a result of sectarian violence from 2012–2013; and as punishment for alleged terrorism 
from 2016–2017. Dr. Nasir Uddin, a professor of anthropology at the University of 
Chittagong, describes the history of the Rohingya since 1962 as one “rife with exploitation, 
persecution, and discrimination.”8 
This chapter provides an overview of the Rohingya in Myanmar and an 
examination of their treatment at the hands of the government.9 It touches on competing 
narratives of the first Muslims to arrive in the region, explains the historical friction around 
the term Rohingya, and examines the influential events and waves of persecution, 
particularly those since Myanmar’s independence in 1948. This summary is intended to 
serve as a consolidated historical account of the Rohingya and provides detail that this 
thesis will use to examine the ongoing Rohingya crisis in Myanmar. 
                                                 
7 Hannah Beech, “Desperate Rohingya Flee Myanmar on Trail of Suffering: ‘It Is All Gone,’” New 
York Times, September 2, 2017, sec. Asia Pacific, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/02/world/asia/rohingya-myanmar-bangladesh-refugees-massacre.html. 
8 Nasir Uddin, “State of Stateless People: The Plight of Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh,” in The 
Human Right to Citizenship: A Slippery Concept, ed. Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann and Margaret Walton-
Roberts, Pennsylvania Studies in Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 
67–68, https://muse.jhu.edu/. 
9 In 1989, the military government in Burma changed the name of the country to the Republic of the 
Union of Myanmar and changed many state names, including Arakan State becoming Rakhine State. This 
change remains contested, as it was done without consult of the citizens. For clarity, this thesis will use 
Myanmar and Rakhine State for events post-1989, unless the use of the former name is needed. 
8 
A. ORIGINS OF ROHINGYA: FROM 9TH CENTURY TO EARLY 19TH 
CENTURY 
The origins of the Rohingya are debated in academia and particularly within the 
current state of Myanmar. Jacques Leider, chairman of the École Française d’Extrême-
Orient (EFEO) in Bangkok and a Myanmar scholar, for example, contends that the name 
“Rohingya,” as a description of the Muslims living in Rakhine, lacks broad understanding 
and agreed upon meaning.10 In the simplest terms, some believe Rohingya are a distinct 
ethno-religious category indigenous to the Rakhine State and, as such, should be given full 
citizenship of Myanmar. Alternately, others, including the current government of 
Myanmar, claim the Rohingya are Bengali (Bangladeshi) immigrants that migrated under 
British rule, and therefore do not have the right to citizenship. 
Most scholars agree that the first Muslims in Burma arrived during the Ninth 
Century in an area that first became known as Arakan, and were primarily seafarers, 
fisherman and traders.11 Dr. Moshe Yegar, a research fellow at the Harry S. Truman 
Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and a former senior Israeli diplomat in 
Burma, describes that, after the ninth century, a significant wave of Bengali Muslims came 
into the area, around 1430, following the conversion of Bengal to Islam. He states, “Arakan 
served to a large extent as a bridgehead for Muslim penetration to other parts of Burma, 
although the Muslims never attained the same degree of importance elsewhere as they did 
in Arakan.”12 Yegar goes on to explain that Arakan developed close ties to Bengal and 
their Muslim communities as a result of the largely impassable mountains that 
geographically isolated Arakan from Burma.13 For this reason, when the Burmese 
Kingdom conquered the Kingdom of Arakan in the late 1800s, many thousands of 
Arakanese Muslims fled to Bengal to escape the violence.14 However, the Muslims who 
                                                 
10 Jacques P. Leider, “Rohingya: The Name, the Movement, the Quest for Identity,” in Nation Building 
in Myanmar (Yangon: Myanmar Egress/Myanmar Peace Center, 2013), 4–8. 
11 Moshe Yegar, The Muslims of Burma: A Study of a Minority Group, Schriftenreihe Des Südasien-
Instituts Der Universität Heidelberg (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1972), 2. 
12 Yegar, 18. 
13 Yegar, 18. 
14 Leider, “Rohingya,” 12. 
9 
remained in Burma were a small minority population and the Burmese Kingdom, which 
was Theravada Buddhist, permitted them to practice their religion freely, intermarry, and 
participate in society.15 
It was during the 1800s that the term “Rohingya” was first used in the historical 
record. In 1799, Dr. Francis Buchanan, a British medical doctor and a member of the 
diplomatic mission in the region, published a report that identified three distinct dialects 
spoken in the Arakan region, one of which was, “spoken by the Mohammedans, who have 
long settled in Arakan, and who call themselves ‘Rooinga,’ or natives of Arakan.”16 This 
account is often used as evidence of Rohingya Muslims in pre-colonial times.17 However, 
Leider details the etymological and linguistic origins of the term “Rohingya” and 
concludes, “‘Rohingya’ does not refer to, or mean anything else, but ‘Rakhine’ in the local 
Muslim language,” and does not describe a distinct ethnic group.18 Leider further claims 
“Rohingyas conflate the history of all Muslims in Rakhine’s past with their own condition 
in Myanmar today and they hold the belief that ‘Rohingyas’ have existed in Rakhine for 
many generations.”19 This debate over the arrival and distinct origins of Rohingya Muslims 
would later have important implications for their citizenship in independent Myanmar. 
B. THE ROHINGYA DURING THE BRITISH COLONIAL ERA: FROM 
1824 TO 1948 
British colonial expansion in South Asia directly affected Burma and further 
changed the debate on the origins of the Arakan Muslims. From 1824 to 1885, the British 
and the Burmese kingdoms fought three wars, culminating with the British completely 
annexing Burma in 1885 and placing Arakan under British control through their 
government in India. As part of a wider colonial policy aimed at maximizing economic 
                                                 
15 Yegar, The Muslims of Burma: A Study of a Minority Group, 27. 
16 Francis Buchanan, “A Comparative Vocabulary of Some of the Languages Spoken in the Burma 
Empire,” Asiatic Researches 5 (1799): 219–40. 
17 Md. Mahbubul Haque, “Rohingya Ethnic Muslim Minority and the 1982 Citizenship Law in 
Burma,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 37, no. 4 (October 2, 2017): 463–64, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2017.1399600. 
18 Leider, “Rohingya,” 9–10. 
19 Leider, 2. 
10 
efficiency, the government in Rangoon imported large numbers of Indians, both Muslim 
and Hindu, to Burma to serve as laborers, civil servants, and merchants.20 Martin Smith, a 
writer and journalist who focuses on Burmese issues, notes that, at its height, over half of 
Rangoon was Indian immigrants.21 Smith further notes that the Burmese grew to resent the 
large influx of migrants under the British and popular cartoons during the colonial period 
depicted Burmese “squeezed out of their own country by a motley crowd of ‘guests,’ i.e., 
Europeans, Chinese, Hindus, and Muslims.”22 
Within Arakan, Leider asserts that the British occupation enabled many of the 
Arakan people who had fled during the 1785 Burmese conquest of Arakan to return. He 
further claims that along with these previous residents came new settlers from Chittagong 
(in current day Bangladesh), drawn by the promise of economic opportunity.23 However, 
insufficient and vague census data from this period make these claims difficult to verify.24 
Yegar notes that, in addition to a possible increase in Arakan Muslims during this 
time, the Muslims in this area also “established mosques, religious schools, and other 
institutions, even newspapers, which the Burmese Muslims before them had not done at 
all.”25 He argues that this was due in large part to the number of Muslims that had come 
from India.26 Yegar further notes that, in the early nineteenth century, there were twice as 
many Indian Muslims in Arakan as local Muslims and with this influx of people came 
money, initiative, and “will to act to protect their separate religious and cultural identity in 
the midst of their Buddhist environment.”27 
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In 1930, after decades of Indian migrants coming to Burma, the Burmese citizens 
instigated broad anti-Indian riots, and specifically anti-Muslim riots, which resulted in the 
deaths of over 140 Muslims, according to a government-commissioned report.28 As a 
result, India and Burma signed an immigration agreement in 1941 in order to set limits on 
the number of immigrant coming to Burma; however, World War II prevented the law from 
going into effect.29 
In 1942, the Imperial Japanese Army invaded Burma. The front line between the 
British and the Japanese ran through the country; the Arakan State sided with British forces 
and the Buddhist majority of the country allied with Japanese forces.30 The invasion caused 
approximately 22,000 Muslims to flee Arakan to Chittagong, and the retreat of the British 
created a “political void,” which gave rise to riots between Arakan Buddhists and 
remaining Muslims.31 During this time, both sides perpetrated brutal attacks. Yegar argues 
that it was in fact the Japanese invasion and the resulting tit-for-tat violence that sharply 
divided Arakan along religious lines.32  
In 1945, the British recaptured the Arakan region and re-established rule across the 
country. In 1946, Arakan Muslim leaders made a bid to become part of the newly forming 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan through East Bengal.33 At the same time, a separate group 
called the North Arakan Muslim League proposed an independent Muslim State in 
Arakan.34 These movements prompted the government to identify these groups in Arakan 
as “Mujahid Rebels.”35 Despite the best effort of the Mujahid, Aung San, the Burmese 
Political leader orchestrating independence, denied all requests to negotiate a new 
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international border or to give Muslims in Arakan independence. The British formally 
granted Burma independence in 1948.36 
C. BURMESE INDEPENDENCE: FROM 1948 TO 1961 
Almost immediately following its independence, Burma was embroiled in conflict. 
Five separate rebellions erupted in the first year of independence, including one in 
Arakan.37 Yegar notes that, in 1948, Buddhists in Arakan replaced the pre-independence 
Muslim government officials, and internally displaced Buddhist citizens were allowed to 
reclaim the land they lost to Muslims in the previous years.38 In response, the Mujahid 
began calling for jihad against the Arakan Buddhists, starting a spiritually-fueled struggle 
for a Muslim state in Arakan.39 Yegar notes, however, that this uprising ranged from 2,000 
to 5,000 men out of approximately 100,000 to 120,000 Muslims in Arakan.40 The number 
of rebels, in other words, was small. 
In 1948, the leader of the Arakan Muslim rebels, Jafar Kawal, made the following 
five requests of the Burmese government: 
(1) declare the Akyab (Northern Arakan) district to be an autonomous Free 
Muslim State under the sovereignty of Burma; (2) recognize Urdu as the 
language of the state; (3) establish independent schools whose language of 
instruction would be Urdu; (4) release prisoners; (5) grant legal status to the 
Mujahid movement.41 
However, in 1961, government forces and Arakan Buddhists defeated the Mujahid through 
several military campaigns.42 Additionally, Pakistan, which controlled Bengal, and Burma 
signed an agreement that increased cooperation between their respective border commands, 
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which limited the previously practice of Mujahid crossing the frontier to launch attacks on 
Arakan from the safety of Bengal.43 
In 1960, the first Burmese Prime Minister, U Nu, promised to grant Arakan 
autonomy within Burma.44 Muslim leaders drafted a proposal that would ensure equal, 
proportionate representation for Muslims and Buddhists in Arakan and alternated between 
Muslim and non-Muslim leaders for both the head of state and deputy positions.45 
Importantly, the proposal guaranteed each group the right to preserve their culture through 
religion, education, and language.46 In 1961, the Burmese government granted the Mujahid 
the “Mayu Frontier District” as a semi-autonomous region directly administered by the 
Burmese military. However, by 1964, the new military junta dissolved the Mayu District 
as part of ongoing changes throughout the country to consolidate power.47 This decision 
marked the beginning of 50 years of authoritarian, military rule in the country. 
D. AUTHORITARIAN STATE: FROM 1962 TO 2011 
General Ne Win, with the backing of the Burmese Army (known as the Tatmadaw), 
led a coup to take control of Burma in March 1962. The authoritarian junta dissolved U 
Nu’s parliamentary government and took control of Burma, ushering in a socialist state.48 
Smith asserts that General Ne Win’s policies ensured a military-led government where 
political repression was common and former slogans such as “unity in diversity” were 
dismissed.49 Two main efforts provided the foundation for the Burma Socialist Program: 
the build-up of a centralized government, and the destruction of any armed opposition to 
the party.50 The military maintained a highly centralized and tightly controlled government 
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that included direct control of the economy, education, and the press.51 Sean Turnell, an 
economist and special consultant to the State Counselor of Myanmar, concludes that the 
coup eventually led to one of the most oppressive regimes in the world.52  
In the wake of the coup, the military enacted harsh economic rules on foreign-
owned businesses in an effort to nationalize the country’s economy. This sparked what 
became the first mass migration flow from the country.53 Yegar estimates that, in the period 
from 1963 to 1967, over 300,000 Indians (mostly Muslims) and 100,000 Chinese left the 
country as a result.54 The mass exodus of business owners, including the Muslims in 
Arakan, left Burma in a financial crisis.55 Smith argues that this economic crisis helped 
cause a Muslim militant movement to form in Arakan, including the Rohingya 
Independence Force and the Muslim National Liberation Party.56 Yegar asserts that the 
rebel leaders from these movements reached out to other Muslim countries, mainly Saudi 
Arabia, seeking aid and arms in their struggle against the Burmese government, but they 
did not send support.57 
A second forced migration occurred between 1971 and 1979. Bangladesh’s struggle 
for independence in 1971 prompted an unknown number of Bengali Muslims to flee to 
Arakan to escape the violence.58 When the violence subsided, approximately 17,000 
Bengali Muslims returned to Bangladesh from Arakan, but an unknown number 
remained.59 Over the ensuing years, the Buddhist population increasingly persecuted the 
Muslims, resulting in untold numbers of Muslims fleeing to Bangladesh.60 Simultaneously, 
the government of Burma expressed increasing concern over violence attributed to 
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“illegal immigrants from Bangladesh” and the Tatmadaw used this as justification for 
Operation “Naga Min” (Dragon King) in 1978, a census ostensibly aimed at identifying 
immigrants as well as refining demographic data in the problem regions of Burma.61 In 
reality, Naga Min forced thousands of Arakan Muslims from their homes when they failed 
to produce proper documents, despite not having received identity cards in 1962 when the 
government issued them to all citizens.62 Yegar argues that the government conducted 
Naga Min to support General Ne Win’s goal of suppressing minorities seeking autonomy 
in the Arakan State.63 
Renaud Egreteau, a research professor at the University of Hong Kong, and Larry 
Jagan, a former editor for Asia at the BBC World Service claim that Naga Min forced more 
than 200,000 Arakan refugees into Bangladesh.64 Egreteau and Jagan further note that the 
refugees reported violent abuses at the hands of Arakan Buddhists and the Tatmadaw.65 
Smith claims that, following an international outcry, the majority of the Muslims who 
found refuge in Bangladesh were allowed to return as “bona fide Burmese citizens.”66 
However, Yegar notes that the repatriation process was difficult because the Rohingya 
were required to provide proof of residency before being allowed into Burma and they were 
unable to return to their original towns because Arakan Buddhists had taken over the vacant 
villages.67 
In 1982, the Tatmadaw created the Burma Citizenship Law with the aim of 
regulating immigration and creating a unitary society, thus ending the diverse society 
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installed by the British.68 However, Yegar contends that the law intended to safeguard 
dominant positions of power and advantage for the Burmese people who were present in 
the country before 1823.69 Mahbubul Haque, a lecturer of political science at Prince of 
Songkla University in Thailand, details three main factors that led to the citizenship law: 
overall Burmese sentiment toward Chinese and South Asian people who emigrated to 
Burma during colonialism; the growth of the Muslim population in Arakan State; and that 
the 1948 Citizenship Law failed to create immigration control.70 
The government’s new citizenship law named 1823 as the date to determine 
citizenship eligibility because it was the start of the first Anglo-Burmese war and the 
British policy of open immigration between India and Arakan.71 The law further delineated 
three categories of citizenship: natural citizens, associate citizens, and naturalized citizens. 
Natural citizens had the most rights and come from the Kachin, Kayah, Karen, Chin, 
Burman, Mon, Rakhine or Shan ethnic groups. Associate citizens, or the offspring of mixed 
marriages with at least one parent being a natural citizen, were allowed to work but they 
could not hold government office.72 The third-class citizens, the naturalized, were the 
offspring of groups who illegally immigrated to Burma during the British rule, which 
included the Rohingya.73 Through this law, the government effectively rendered the 
Rohingya stateless and systematically discriminated against naturalized citizens.74 
In 1988, General Ne Win stepped down as the leader of the Burma Socialist 
Programme Party amidst large-scale pro-democracy protests and demonstrations that also 
included the Rohingya.75 The new regime, the State Law and Order Restoration Council 
(SLORC), quickly took control of the country by violently putting down the 
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demonstrations.76 The SLORC changed the name of the country from Burma to the 
Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Arakan State to Rakhine State, and many other state 
level titles that they perceived to be holdovers from the British colonial period.77 
The third wave of forced migration of Rohingya into Bangladesh occurred from 
1988–1992. Yegar notes that the new government severely punished the Rohingya for their 
participation in the previous protests, which caused many of them to flee, followed by 
Rakhine Buddhists seizing Muslims lands.78 Renewed persecution in mid-1991 sent a 
much larger group of over 250,000 Rohingya into the Bangladesh border districts. Egreteau 
and Jagan attribute this violence to “state and local Burmese authorities in Arakan.”79 
By July 1992, Bangladesh recorded 268,551 refugees from Myanmar and the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) eventually classified 228,000 
of them as Rohingya.80 The SLORC government came under harsh criticism from the UN 
General Assembly and the UN Human Rights Commission for violently putting down the 
pro-democracy protests, refusing to repatriate refugees from Bangladesh, and for human 
rights violations.81 In April 1992, Myanmar and Bangladesh signed an agreement to 
repatriate refugees, but progress was slow and fraught with mistrust and accusations 
of unfulfilled promises.82 Still, by the end of 1996, 200,000 refugees had returned to 
Rakhine State.83 
                                                 
76 Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 62. 
77 Gustaaf Houtman, Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics: Aung San Suu Kyi and the National 
League for Democracy, ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa Monograph Series 33 
(Tokyo: Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia 
and Africa, 1999), 46–54. 
78 Yegar, 63. 
79 Egreteau and Jagan, Soldiers and Diplomacy in Burma, 149. 
80 Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 63–64. 
81 Yegar, 64. 
82 Yegar, 64–66. 
83 Yegar, 65–66. 
18 
E. NEW DEMOCRACY: FROM 2012 TO 2018  
The pro-democracy movement continued to build momentum during the 1990s and 
early 2000s as more and more members of the country demanded a voice in government.84 
The movement produced a newly ratified constitution in 2008, parliamentary elections in 
2010, and a formal transfer of power from the military junta to a semi-civilian government 
in early 2011.85 The first civilian president elected, Thein Sein, had only months earlier 
retired from the Tatmadaw, making him an easy target for those who claimed that 
the election was a sham. However, the government released a longtime advocate for 
democracy and icon in Myanmar politics, Aung San Suu Kyi, from house arrest and 
allowed her to run for political office.86 She was elected to parliament in April 2012 as part 
of the National League for Democracy (NLD) party and became the international face 
of Myanmar.87 
However, also in 2012, sectarian violence erupted between Muslims and Buddhists 
in Rakhine after three Muslims allegedly raped a Buddhist woman. A group of Rakhine 
Buddhists retaliated by stopping a bus and killing ten Muslims who were on board.88 Both 
sides engaged in arson and indiscriminate killing throughout the state.89 Smith notes that 
security forces did nothing to stop the violence; they either refused to intervene or they 
joined the Rakhine Buddhists and helped attack and destroy Muslim villages and 
communities.90 A Human Rights Watch report published after the incident argues that what 
started as sectarian violence began to appear as a coordinated effort to forcibly expel the 
Muslims through simultaneous attacks occurring across the state.91 This report also 
suggests that the evidence collected by their team through 104 interviews of victims, 
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witnesses, and aid workers proves that local religious (Buddhist Monks) and political 
leaders urged the ethnic cleansing via pamphlets and public messages.92 These calls to 
action used several different types of appeals including denying the existence of the 
Rohingya ethnicity, demonizing the Rohingya, economically isolating the Rohingya, and 
calling for the removal of the Rohingya from the country.93 This violence prompted a 
fourth wave of persecution against the Rohingya. Smith notes that, as a result of this 
violence and persecution, by early 2013, approximately 100,000 Rohingya had been 
displaced and 8,664 homes destroyed by the violence, of which 7,422 homes belonged to 
the Rohingya.94 
In response to the violence, the president of Myanmar, Thein Sein, stated, “We will 
take care of our own ethnic nationalities, but Rohingya who came to Burma illegally are 
not of our ethnic nationalities, and we cannot accept them here.”95 Penny Green, Thomas 
MacManus, and Alicia de la Cour Venning, of Queen Mary University of London, note 
that, by the end of the violence in 2013, approximately 138,000 Rohingya had been forcibly 
moved to refugee camps, and were prevented from returning to their homes or blocked 
from employment in the state.96  
The fifth wave of forced migration began in October 2016, when approximately 
300 Muslim men from a group calling themselves “Harakah al-Yaqin” (HaY, “Faith 
Movement”) attacked multiple border checkpoints in the northern region of Rakhine 
State.97 The International Crisis Group (ICG) reports that the attackers killed nine security 
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guards and assailants captured 62 firearms as well as 10,000 rounds of ammunition.98 
Buddhists in the area and state security forces retaliated by razing over 1,500 buildings and 
firing indiscriminately into villages with an attack helicopter, killing men, women, and 
children.99 The ICG notes that the group did not enjoy broad appeal and their actions were 
actively debated in the Rohingya community. 
Some (Rohingya) felt they were “dying slowly day by day,” and that after 
years of desperation and hopelessness, someone was standing up for them. 
But there was considerable criticism of the group (HaY) in WhatsApp for 
not consulting or warning the community before the attacks and not 
considering the very serious consequences.100 
On 25 August 2017, HaY, now referring to itself as Arakan Rohingya Salvation 
Army (ARSA), mustered hundreds of individuals to attack 30 border checkpoints and an 
army base, resulting in the death of 14 security forces and 371 fighters.101 According to the 
ICG, Myanmar security forces swiftly and indiscriminately reacted by razing villages and 
forcing the largest exodus of Rohingya to date. By the end of 2017, approximately 671,000 
had migrated to Bangladesh alone and joined the 200,000 Rohingya still in Bangladesh 
from the 2012 wave of forced migration.102 A Human Rights Watch report documents 
refugees’ stories of atrocities committed by the Myanmar military, including executions 
and rape, and satellite imagery shows that the Myanmar military cleared 55 of the 362 
villages that were burned to the ground.103 
While the ICG does not consider the Rohingya population in northern Rakhine 
radicalized, they do believe that small portions of the population have supported the 
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insurgency in some capacity and have demonstrated a desire to fight back after years of 
oppression.104 As of 2018, the widespread clearance operations by Myanmar’s security 
forces have ceased, but the Rohingya remain concentrated largely in refugee camps along 
the border in Bangladesh.  
In November 2017, the governments of Bangladesh and Myanmar reached an 
agreement to begin repatriation of the Rohingya as early as January 2018; however, the 
agreement contained fundamental flaws that risk the safety and security of the Rohingya 
and decrease the likelihood of success in the overall repatriation process.105 As Green et al. 
note, “the Rohingya are to be returned to concentration camps inside Myanmar, a society 
that has clearly shown it does not want them…Indeed, the repatriation agreement could 
simply be another stage in the planned, continuing annihilation of the Rohingya.”106  
In March 2018, the United Nations Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, 
Adama Dieng, visited Rohingya in Bangladesh and surmised, “the majority of the 
Rohingya want to return to Myanmar, but only when they are able to do so in safety, dignity 
and with access to the basic rights that are fundamental to us all.”107 Dieng elaborated: 
The solution to this problem lies first and foremost with the Myanmar 
authorities, by creating the conditions for the Rohingya population to return 
home in safety and be entitled to the same rights as any other citizen of 
Myanmar. The international community also has a responsibility to protect 
this population from the risk of further atrocity crimes. Under the present 
conditions, returning to Myanmar will put the Rohingya population at risk 
of further crimes.108 
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As of August 2018, the government of Myanmar claimed to have repatriated one Rohingya 
family, but this assertion was disputed by both Bangladesh and UNHCR, who claim that 
the statement is merely propaganda since they were not involved in the process and no 
agency has independently verified Myanmar’s claim.109 
F. CONCLUSION 
Since its founding as the nation of Burma, Myanmar has demonstrated a consistent 
pattern of persecution against the Rohingya and has forced them from their homes in waves 
of increasing frequency. At the highest levels of Myanmar’s government, officials continue 
to describe the Rohingya as illegal Bengali immigrants.110 Despite the persecution they 
have experienced, the Rohingya have not radicalized yet, nor have significant numbers 
used organized violence as a means to pursue their objective of legal recognition and 
citizenship in Myanmar. 
The next chapter will explore the international community’s response to the 
Rohingya crisis and examine implications of different countries’ actions in an effort to 
understand the possibility of the Rohingya turning toward radicalization. 
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III. THE LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO 
THE ROHINGYA CRISIS 
In August 2017, the mass migration of the Rohingya, became world news after 
Myanmar’s military began to forcibly displace hundreds of thousands from its borders. 
The Myanmar government blamed the forced migration on the insurgent group HaY, which 
attacked multiple border checkpoints in the northern region of Rakhine and killed 
14 Myanmar security guards.111 Within weeks, hundreds of thousands of Rohingya fled 
into Bangladesh seeking safety from the Myanmar military. Despite the official reason for 
the military’s crackdown on the Rohingya, the persecution had begun much earlier, in 
October 2016, and the events in August were merely the culmination of multiple years of 
persecution, as described in Chapter II.112 
The massive forced migration and protracted persecution of the Rohingya has 
raised concerns about the potential for radicalization of this group, especially in the host 
country of Bangladesh. Using a framework developed by RAND for refugee radicalization, 
this chapter seeks to investigate whether or not the local and international response is 
stunting the potential for radicalization of this population and, especially, the development 
of radical Islamic organizations within the Rohingya refugee population. 
Overall, the chapter finds that Bangladesh, the principal host country, while 
struggling to manage a nearly unprecedented refugee crisis, has taken several measures 
that could potentially contribute to the radicalization of this vulnerable population. 
Specifically, it has created restrictive legal policies on the Rohingya refugee population, 
including denying a path to citizenship, and has confined the refugees to over-populated 
camps near the border of Myanmar. Furthermore, the regional and international 
humanitarian relief efforts are underfunded, and international actors are frequently 
inconsistent in their words and actions regarding the crisis, resulting in little international 
pressure on the government or military of Myanmar to change its policies and actions. The 
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RAND framework for radicalization posits that all of these factors are likely to increase 
the potential for radicalization of the Rohingya. 
The chapter begins by providing a summary of the RAND framework for refugee 
radicalization, underscoring the framework’s most critical variable for radicalization: the 
host country’s administrative policies of the refugees. This section further identifies two 
additional variables of importance: donations (financial support) and the regional and 
international community’s response to the crisis through public statements. The chapter 
then uses these three variables to analyze what effect the response is having on reducing 
the likelihood of radicalization among the Rohingya. 
A. RAND REFUGEE RADICALIZATION FRAMEWORK 
A 2015 RAND report titled Lessening the Risk of Refugee Radicalization: Lessons 
for the Middle East from Past Crises focuses specifically on the conditions under which 
refugee populations turn toward radicalization and armed resistance. The report begins by 
noting that, “poverty and physical deprivation have less impact on the degree of 
radicalization than actions or omissions on the part of the receiving country and the 
international community.”113 The report examines nine cases of mass refugee flows, either 
from armed conflict or ethnic persecution: two cases of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh 
(1975–1978 and 1989–1992), which are the second and third waves discussed in Chapter 
II; two cases of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran (1978–1988 and the 1990s); 
Somalis in Kenya (1990s–2000s); Rwandans in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(1990s–2000s); Palestinians in the Middle East, particularly in Lebanon (1967–1993); 
Eritreans in Sudan (1974-1991); and Iraqis in Jordan and Syria (2000s).114 Of these nine 
cases, the report finds that seven resulted in radicalization—the second case of Rohingya 
in the early 1990s; both cases of Afghans in Pakistan and Iran; Rwandans in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo; Palestinians in Lebanon; Eritreans in Sudan; and Iraqis in Jordan 
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and Syria—while the first case of Rohingya and Somalis in Kenya did not result in 
radicalization.115 
Overall, the report finds that radicalization of refugees is not inevitable; rather 
radicalization occurs on a continuum of risk that increases based on how the host country 
and international community manage the following six categories: host country 
administrative and legal policies; preexisting militant groups; the level of security; the 
amount of shelter; local economic conditions; and conditions for youth.116 The report finds 
these six categories are the most influential in predicting the likelihood of radicalization. 
The report further identifies 16 variables that may predict radicalization of refugees. These 
categories and variables are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1. RAND Framework’s Six Key Categories 
and 16 Key Variables117 
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Six Key Categories 
• Host country’s administrative, legal 
policies 
• Shelter 
• Political and militant organizing • Security 
• Local economic conditions and resilience • Conditions for youth 
16 Key Variables 
• Reasons for leaving the country of origin • Organization of refugee 
facilities 
• Ethnic and religious differences  • Employment 
• Numbers of refugees • Education 
• Legal status • Refugees’ external contacts 
• Principal NGOs involved • Criminal activity 
• Receiving-state policies • Security arrangements 
• Sending-state policies • Presence of armed groups 
• Type of settlement/housing  • Political Organization among 
refugees 
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The report stresses in particular that the host country’s legal and administrative 
policies are the most important and influenced all other risk factors.118 Specifically, the 
study finds that in every case of refugee radicalization “the receiving countries pursued 
inconsistent, sometimes punitive, policies in dealing with refugees—often, but not always, 
as their numbers escalated in proportion to the host country population.”119 When the host 
country limited the rights and options for refugees to become citizens, to freely enter and 
exit the camps, to obtain legal employment, or to receive education services the outcome 
trended toward radicalization.120 
The report further investigates the conditions under which militant groups emerged 
in refugee populations. The study states that it may be impossible to avoid radicalization if 
extremist elements arrive with refugees and are not disbanded or separated from the refugee 
population.121 In the case studies that resulted in radicalization, Rwandans in the DRC and 
Eritreans in Sudan had at least a moderate amount of extremist groups present that used 
the refugee populations to support militant groups through recruitment and by spreading 
propaganda.122 Furthermore, the report finds that refugee populations become more 
vulnerable to radicalization when extremist groups assume a leadership role in the camps, 
sometimes supported by the host country or by Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs).123 
The report also investigates the role that internal and external security of the refugee 
camps played in preventing radicalization. The responsibility of security typically falls to 
the host country and, to a lesser extent, the NGOs working within the camp.124 If the 
security of the camp is well enforced, the study suggests it is easier to prevent radical 
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groups from obtaining access to the population.125 Conversely, the study finds that, as 
internal and external security decreased, the likelihood for radicalization increased. In the 
cases they studied, especially Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, the report finds that 
the host country tends to favor geographic isolation over robust security forces, which 
makes effective policing difficult and leaves the refugee population vulnerable.126 To 
overcome these challenges, the study advocates reducing the likelihood of radicalization 
by “a combination of refugee self-empowerment, tightened internal security in camps, and 
security assistance to host country police forces.”127 
The quality, placement, and duration of shelter is another important variable for 
predicting radicalization of refugees. The study finds that crowded camps with unsanitary 
conditions, food scarcity, and limited resources increased the risk of radicalization.128 
Additionally, the majority of the cases that resulted in radicalization occurred in rural 
encampments, close to the border of their country of origin.129 The report specifically notes 
the case of Somali refugees in Kenya, where refugees were moved to camps in rural areas 
near the border, and armed groups were able to recruit refugees to fight in Somalia.130 
Importantly, the study suggests, “the longer refugees are confined to camps and the 
lower the likelihood that the initiating crisis will be resolved quickly, the greater the risk 
of radicalization.”131 
The report also considers economic conditions and “resilience,” which are 
opportunities available to the refugee population and the economic conditions surrounding 
the camp. The study notes, in particular, that aid to refugees can have spillover effects on 
the local population.132 Specifically, relief efforts and supplies provided to refugees can 
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make the local population feel “disadvantaged” if they are not receiving similar products 
and services from their government.133 Additionally, refugees often compete with locals 
for opportunities to support themselves and their families through goods and services, 
which places an additional burden on the local population.134 The report stresses that this 
resentment and competition could lead to an increase in violence between the local 
population and refugees, which in turn could be exploited by radical groups.135 For 
example, the study finds that several economically weak host countries, including 
Bangladesh, have restricted refugees’ freedom of movement in order to prevent 
employment competition with local citizens.136 This policy has made the refugees more 
dependent on the camp services and reduces self-reliance. In the most vulnerable cases, the 
economic conditions for refugees and the surrounding population are invariably poor, and 
the study asserts that this could be a driver of radicalization.137 
Finally, the conditions for youth address the 15- to 24-year-old refugee 
population—the age-group most vulnerable to militant and extremist recruitment—and the 
opportunities available to them.138 The study finds that educational opportunities that 
support future employment reduce their risk of radicalization.139 Of the cases where 
radicalization occurred, specifically Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran, the conditions 
for youth were ranked as “poor,” meaning that youth had little to no economic or 
educational opportunities.140 
Drawing from this report, this chapter will use the most critical variable, the host 
country’s policies, to determine if Bangladesh’s response to the current crisis is lessening 
the risk of radicalization within the Rohingya refugee camps. Specifically, this chapter will 
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look at Bangladesh’s policies toward citizenship, security, shelter, economic conditions, 
camp conditions, and affected youth. Furthermore, this chapter will draw on two additional 
variables not identified in the RAND framework: donations (financial support); and public 
statements by heads of state and International Organizations (IOs). Specifically, the chapter 
will consider the donations and statements of regional actors (Myanmar, Bangladesh, 
Thailand, Malaysia, China, India, and Sri Lanka); international actors (the United States, 
Britain, Canada, Australia, Russia, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan); and IOs (Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and 
the UN). 
These additional variables are important because, first, financial support enables 
virtually all other functions of refugee relief and radicalization mitigation. Without 
significant financial support from the international community, almost none of the other 
variables from the RAND framework could be addressed. Furthermore, the source of the 
donations may help identify countries and organizations with significant influence in the 
crisis and countries that may seek to encourage radicalization or have had ties to extremism. 
Therefore, within this investigation, the sources of the donations will also be identified in 
addition to amounts of money. 
Second, government and IO statements are important to consider. Specifically, this 
chapter will consider what countries and IOs have said publicly and will try to compare 
these words against their actions to see if they are consistent or not. The RAND framework 
briefly mentions that international political and diplomatic efforts are “critical” to align 
objectives across the spectrum of responses to resolve refugees crises, including resolving 
the original conflict in the country of origin.141 Therefore, it is important to identify where 
international actors stand, both in words and in deeds. 
B. ANALYSIS OF BANGLADESH’S POLICIES TOWARD THE ROHINGYA  
The RAND report identifies the host country policies toward a refugee population 
as the most important factor for the prevention of radicalization. Drawing from the RAND 
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framework, this section considers the following policies that Bangladesh has implemented 
toward the Rohingya refugee population: citizenship, security, shelter, economic 
conditions, camp conditions, and affected youth. 
Overall, the policies of Bangladesh have aimed to accommodate the Rohingya, but 
there are some significant shortcomings that, according to the RAND framework, could 
lead to radicalization. The March 2018 Joint Response Plan (JRP), a comprehensive 
strategy of the humanitarian relief efforts for the Rohingya published by the Strategic 
Executive Group—a committee based in Dhaka and co-chaired by the UN resident 
coordinator, International Organization for Migration chief of mission, and a UNHCR 
representative—praised Bangladesh for allowing the Rohingya to cross into its country and 
for leading the humanitarian response.142 It also highlighted significant concerns regarding 
the long-term welfare of the Rohingya and the need for an integrated, sustained response 
from the international community.143 
Despite the enormity of the crisis, Bangladesh had some measures in place to 
address the crisis. In 2013, the Bangladeshi government created the National Task Force, 
a unit that aimed to address the Rohingya crisis through its “national strategy on Myanmar 
refugees and undocumented Myanmar nationals.”144 The National Task Force, therefore, 
was already in place when the next wave of Rohingya refugees began in 2016. By the 
beginning of August 2017, Bangladesh was already hosting an estimated 200,000 
Rohingya.145 Following the mass exodus, the country kept its borders open and allowed 
another 671,000 Rohingya to cross into its country.146 
Despite efforts to accommodate refugees, Bangladesh has not offered citizenship 
to the Rohingya. Bangladesh’s immigration policy states that the only way to obtain 
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citizenship is through marriage to a Bangladeshi, or if one parent is Bangladeshi.147 
Subsequently, Bangladesh passed a law in 2014 that specifically prohibits marriage 
between Bangladesh citizens and Rohingya; violators could face up to seven years in jail.148 
Furthermore, Rohingya born in Bangladesh are given birth certificates that label them as 
citizens of Myanmar, something the government of Myanmar rejects.149 As noted in the 
previous section, the RAND framework suggests that laws that deny citizenship to refugees 
may increase the risk of radicalization. 
Bangladesh has also taken measures to provide security for Rohingya refugees in 
the areas in which they are residing. Bangladesh has dedicated 2,158 police officers from 
across the country to focus on the security of the district and to facilitate the biometric 
registration of the refugees.150 Similar to the RAND framework, the International Crisis 
Group (ICG) argues that the increased number of security and intelligence forces around 
the Rohingya refugee camps will make the re-organization and recruitment of ARSA 
difficult.151 In addition to providing more security forces, Bangladesh has attempted to 
empower the Rohingya refugees to assist with internal camp security with a system of 
majhis (traditional leaders) who assist with low-level dispute resolutions, which has helped 
Bangladesh officials focus on major security threats instead of low-level crime.152 Despite 
the efforts of Bangladesh to increase security measures to prevent radicalization, there are 
signs that militant groups have established a presence in the camps. In April 2018, 
Bangladeshi forces arrested several ARSA members near refugee camps, and Rohingya 
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refugee camp community leaders detained 15 suspected ARSA members, turning them 
over to the police.153 However, the fluid nature of the crisis has made confirming these 
claims and measuring the presence of ARSA in the camps all but impossible. 
Bangladesh has provided over 4,800 acres of undeveloped land to establish camps, 
and the country’s military has provided support to the camps. As of 2018, the camps in 
Bangladesh represent the world’s largest concentration of refugees, averaging just over 
30,000 people per square kilometer.154 Figure 1 depicts the locations of six refugee camps 
in Bangladesh and their estimated populations.155 Of note, all of the camps are within nine 
miles of the border with Bangladesh, a point that the RAND framework suggests increases 
the likelihood of militants recruiting from camps.156 
The largest camp, number 1, has an area of 16,806,491 square meters and hosts 
626,502 refugees, allowing 26.8 m2 per person, not including inhospitable areas due to 
terrain or other camp features. Camp number 4 has the largest density at 235.5 m2 per 
person and is situated within a local community. Camp number 4 does not have a distinct 
border but is still considered a refugee camp by the International Organization of Migration 
(IOM). Finally, not included in the data are the remaining 120,000 Rohingya who are living 
outside of designated refugee camps among local communities.157 As noted, the RAND 
framework posits that the greater the number of refugees among the local population 
without support for the entire community, the more likely the local population will 
persecute the refugees. This is a concern echoed by the ICG, which is monitoring changing 
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local sentiment toward the Rohingya and the possibility of violence and instability in areas 
where they interact with the local population.158 
 
Figure 1. Rohingya Refugee Camp Locations159 
Also identified in the RAND framework is the importance of local economic 
conditions, specifically for providing opportunities for refugees. The local economy in 
Cox’s Bazar is severely depressed and the poverty rate of the district is below the national 
average, which is already low.160 The JRP highlights the fact that the Rohingya have largely 
displaced the local unskilled labor force by working for half of what are already meager 
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wages and the government has made efforts restrict Rohingya to the camps through a series 
of checkpoints.161 Restricting the Rohingya to camps reduces their self-reliance and may 
increase the likelihood for radical groups to offer compensation in exchange for 
participation.162 
The conditions in the camps are also an important potential predictor of 
radicalization, according to the RAND report. The JRP repeatedly stresses the importance 
of food security among the large population, and one-third of the camps have an 
unacceptable food consumption score.163 According to the RAND framework, over-
crowded camps with unsanitary conditions can raise the risk of radicalization.164 
Additionally, the UNHCR has repeatedly cited concerns about the overall need to provide 
adequate shelter for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh.165 
Finally, the RAND framework notes the importance of opportunity for youth as a 
means of reducing the chances of extremism taking hold. The JRP specifically mentions 
that the Bangladeshi government has not allowed refugees to enroll in formal education 
facilities and has denied youth certifications from informal education opportunities.166 
These restrictions affect approximately 50% of the total refugee population. To address 
this, the JRP has laid out specific programs that will focus on providing young refugees 
with opportunities geared toward life skills and vocational education.167 However, as of 
2018, these opportunities have yet to be realized, and given the overwhelming 
circumstances in southern Bangladesh, combined with the enormity of need, it is unclear 
how likely it is that these policies will be implemented. 
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C. ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL DONATIONS 
Responding to a crisis of this magnitude requires immense financial support to 
enable the relief efforts and programs that ensure basic needs are met. At the onset of the 
crisis, in 2017, the international community donated over $300 million to the UNHCR 
Rohingya Response efforts.168 However, as the crisis persisted, the response has 
experienced a shortfall in realized donations.169 The JRP cites that over $950 million is 
needed for the response to be fully funded; but as of 31 May 2018, disaster responders had 
only received $250 million, or approximately 27%, of required funding. Furthermore, this 
sum was well below the average funding level of 36% for all 2018 humanitarian response 
efforts tracked by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(UNOCHA).170 
In addition to amounts of funding, it is also useful to identify who has provided the 
funding because funding could be a source of influence to the Rohingya, including a source 
of extremism. Overall, regional countries have contributed very little financial aid to the 
Rohingya crisis, despite their proximity. Aside from Japan, which has given the single 
largest sum, as of 2018, Thailand has donated the most to support relief efforts in 
Bangladesh out of any other country in the region with a reported $100,000.171 India and 
China have elected not to contribute through the UNHCR, possibly due to a longstanding 
rival between countries for economic primacy in Myanmar, and the desire not to upset its 
government.172 Rather, India has contributed to both the Rohingya and Myanmar. Through 
“Operation Insaniyat,” India provided over 373 tons of food and clothing items to the 
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Rohingya in Bangladesh as of 2018, and further pledged $25 million to assist Myanmar 
with development projects in the Rakhine State following the return of refugees.173 China 
delivered a small number of blankets and tents to Bangladesh but has avoided a more 
significant contribution.174 As of 2018, Japan was the second largest overall donor, after 
the United States, at just over $40 million, and effectively matched the donation of the 
United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia.175 As with India, Japan has given both to the 
Rohingya effort and to Myanmar, possibly to blunt China’s influence and promote its 
economic interests.176 
As of 2018, the United States served as the largest contributor to UNHCR by 
donating just over $80 million. The United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia collectively 
donated just under $42 million, effectively half of what the United States has 
contributed.177 Islamic-majority countries have contributed to the relief effort either 
directly or through state-sponsored charities.178 As of 2018, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
leads with over $5 million of donations to the UNHCR Rohingya Response, one third of 
what they donated to the Syria Response. However, these donations are significantly 
smaller than the $730 million invested in the Yemen crisis.179 Pakistan, despite having 
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donated funds to previous Rohingya crises and being home to a sizable Rohingya 
population, has not donated to the Rohingya in Bangladesh.180 
For IOs, the OIC has donated over $5 million to support Rohingya relief efforts 
through its subsidiary organization, the Islamic Development Bank (IDB). In fiscal 
year 2017, the IDB approved just under $10 billion for projects worldwide, meaning that 
.05% of their budget was allocated to the Rohingya, and matched the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia’s donation.181 ASEAN has not donated to the relief effort at all, despite the fact that 
the Rohingya crisis originated from within one of its member states. ASEAN is 
fundamentally an economic and trade association and adheres strictly to their founding 
principle of “non-interference in the internal affairs of one another,” and therefore is 
unlikely to provide aid to the Rohingya moving forward.182 Financial aid to the Rohingya 
is summarized in Figure 2.183 
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Figure 2. Current Joint Response Plan Funding Breakdown184 
Thus, the money to support the Rohingya relief effort comes overwhelmingly from 
Western powers and Japan. As of 2018, this crisis is only in its second year and is unlikely 
to be resolved soon, and donor fatigue is a possibility.185 Money is critically important to 
every aspect of the relief effort, and sustained financial support will allow Bangladesh and 
the UNHCR to focus on mitigating radicalization by addressing the variables identified in 
the RAND study. 
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D. ANALYSIS OF STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS 
The RAND study suggests that the international community can significantly affect 
the likelihood of a refugee population turning toward radicalization based on the way in 
which they help resolve the original conflict.186 This section highlights how governments 
and international organizations have responded to the crisis through public statements and, 
specifically, identifies which are inconsistent in their statements and subsequent actions. 
Overall, while many countries have publicly expressed concern for the Rohingya, they 
continue to conduct trade and other dealings with the government of Myanmar, allowing 
the government and military to continue pursuing its discriminatory policies toward the 
Rohingya. 
First, several members of ASEAN have publicly stated their concern for the 
Rohingya, but they have also been overtly supportive toward the government of Myanmar. 
For example, at the onset of the violence in September 2017, Thailand’s foreign ministry 
issued a statement that claimed, “The Royal Thai Government has always placed great 
importance to providing care and protection to Myanmar displaced persons in accordance 
with humanitarian principle” and seemed intent on assisting the Rohingya.187 However, 
their actions have not been consistent with this statement. In February 2018, the Buddhist-
majority nation presented an award to the Myanmar army commander-in-chief, Senior 
General Min Aung Hlaing, despite the alleged human rights abuses that Myanmar’s 
military has committed.188 Additionally, Thailand is not a signatory to the 1951 UN Status 
of Refugees Convention and does not recognize the Rohingya as refugees. As described in 
                                                 
186 Sude, Stebbins, and Weilant, Lessening the Risk of Refugee Radicalization: Lessons for the Middle 
East from Past Crises, 15, 20. 
187 Kingdom of Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Response to Certain Views on the Situation in 
the Rakhine State,” September 30, 2017, http://www.mfa.go.th/main/en/news3/6886/82025-Response-to-
certain-views-on-the-situation-in-the.html. 




Chapter II, while Thailand has allowed Rohingya to land briefly on its shores to shelter 
from bad weather, it will not permit them to remain in the country.189 
China is perhaps Myanmar’s strongest regional advocate on the global stage. China 
made efforts to solve the crisis through mediated talks with Bangladesh and Myanmar in 
November 2017, but Nicholas Bequelin, the East Asia Regional Director for Amnesty 
International, argues that this appeared to have little to do with the long-term well-being of 
the Rohingya and more to preserve their economic and geopolitical interests.190 China and 
Myanmar reached an agreement in October 2017 on a substantial deep-water port 
development project at Kyaukpyu, in Rakhine State; this port would give China a way to 
export oil and natural gas without transiting the Straits of Malacca.191 In the same month, 
China donated a small amount of aid to help the Rohingya in Bangladesh, but carefully 
phrased their comments about the donation, avoiding the term Rohingya and using 
“displaced people,” in continued support of the Myanmar government’s effort to not 
recognize the Rohingya.192 
India, while giving some aid to the Rohingya, has remained an open supporter of 
the government of Myanmar. In a statement shortly after ARSA attacked the Myanmar 
government checkpoints in August 2017, India’s ministry of external affairs stated “we 
stand by Myanmar in the hour of its crisis, we strongly condemn the terrorist attack on 
August 24–25, 2017 and condole the death of policemen and soldiers, we will back 
Myanmar in its fight against terrorism.”193 The Indian prime minister, Narendra Modi, 
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visited Myanmar in September 2017 and, at a joint press conference with Aung San Suu 
Kyi, did not use the term Rohingya nor did he mention the ongoing violence against them 
at the time.194 India has invested heavily in infrastructure development in the country, 
including the Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport Project, which seeks to connect 
India’s remote northeast region to the Myanmar deep-water port in Rakhine State and may 
explain India’s support for Myanmar.195 However, India did support a UN Human Rights 
Council resolution that called for an inquiry into the actions of the Myanmar military 
against the Rohingya.196 
Malaysia has also sent mixed messages in regard to the conflict. It has accepted 
nearly 100,000 Rohingya refugees in its country, possibly because of shared religion. 
Further, it has been one of the most outspoken critics of Myanmar, breaking from the 
official ASEAN agreement of non-interference to issue a statement about the violence, by 
declaring that “the subsequent clearance operations efforts by Myanmar authorities was 
disproportionate in that it has led to deaths of many innocent civilians and caused more 
than 400,000 Rohingyas to be displaced.”197 Despite this seemingly pro-Rohingya posture, 
Malaysia is not a signatory to the UN Refugee Convention and treats the Rohingya as 
illegal migrants with no legal rights.198 
Furthermore, several international actors have also offered little support to the 
Rohingya in their statements and actions. Sri Lanka’s Prime Minister refused to take in 
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Rohingya despite calls for action by Sri Lanka’s Muslim minority.199 The government in 
Sri Lanka fears that the Rohingya may incite violence and “disturb social harmony” if they 
are permitted asylum and views the refugee crisis as an “organized immigration racket.”200 
Russia has maintained a stance “against excessive intervention” in the internal affairs of a 
state and blocked UN Security Council statements condemning Myanmar.201 As of 2018, 
their position, along with their veto power on the UN Security Council, has prevented the 
Security Council from taking action to refer Myanmar to the International Criminal 
Court.202 Russia also agreed to sell Myanmar new fighter jets early in 2018, despite U.S. 
led requests to suspend arms sales to Myanmar during the ongoing crisis.203 
Japan has consistently supported the government of Myanmar, but has also made 
statements supporting the Rohingya. In a joint news conference with Aung San Suu Kyi 
on January 20, 2018, Japan’s foreign minister, Taro Kono, stated “Japan wants to actively 
support Myanmar’s efforts” and ensure “the safe and voluntary repatriation and 
resettlement” of the Rohingya.204 As previously mentioned, Japan achieved a record high 
investment in Myanmar during the fiscal year 2017, providing $1.47 billion to support 
property, electricity, and road development projects, even beating out regional rival 
China.205 Early in 2018, Japan granted Myanmar $3 million, with a promise of further 
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investment, to help offset the cost of repatriating the Rohingya.206 Similar to India, Japan 
seeks to blunt Chinese influence in the region. 
The United States’ response to the refugee crisis also has been mixed. In 2016, 
President Obama lifted decades-old sanctions on Myanmar and ushered in a new chapter 
of diplomatic relations with the country.207 At times, the United States has been the most 
outspoken against the government of Myanmar, as was the case on 13 February 2018, when 
the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, characterized Myanmar’s denial of ethnic 
cleansing against the Rohingya as “preposterous.”208 Furthermore, the United States was 
quick to withdraw military assistance to Myanmar in October 2017, at the height of the 
crisis, but Zachary Abuza, a professor at the National War College in Washington, DC, 
argues that this move was largely symbolic since the United States only recently began 
working with the Myanmar military and had few programs.209 As of 2018, the United States 
has maintained diplomatic relations with Myanmar and has only placed sanctions on one 
Myanmar Army General, Maung Maung Soe, who was in charge of operations in Rakhine 
State.210 Derek Mitchell, a former U.S. Ambassador to Myanmar, defends the U.S. posture 
toward Myanmar, arguing “the only way you can really have leverage on the military is to 
do something with them, and the only way to really change or hope to change their ways 
is to engage them.”211 Furthermore, he suggests, “you do not get solutions by sanctions. 
You get their attention, but the question is how you are going to get both justice for what 
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has happened as well as justice for the Rohingya.”212 The international response to the 
Rohingya crisis is depicted in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. International Words and Actions Regarding Rohingya Crisis213 
The UN and OIC both publicly condemned the government of Myanmar for their 
actions against the Rohingya in September 2017, yet stopped short of stronger actions. The 
UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, when speaking about the reported violence 
against the Rohingya in Rakhine, said, “This is unacceptable and must end 
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immediately.”214 Despite having banned UN representatives from future entry to Myanmar 
following critical comments regarding the treatment of the Rohingya in December 2017, 
Myanmar did permit other members of the UN to come to Rangoon in April 2018, and 
meet with leaders from Myanmar and Bangladesh. These UN members urged cooperation 
and accountability to prevent further instability.215 The UN Security Council also issued a 
statement on 9 May 2018, which urged Myanmar to conduct thorough investigations into 
the violence perpetrated against the Rohingya and immediately allow aid groups access to 
the Rakhine region.216 
The OIC professed regret for not taking a more involved approach sooner; but, in 
May 2018, vowed to take a much stronger role to defend the Rohingya.217 To this end, they 
stated the intention of creating a committee to investigate the crimes against the Rohingya 
and to hold the perpetrators accountable.218 Additionally, the OIC urged its 57 member 
states to “defend the Rohingya” and “pressure Myanmar into ensuring a safe return for all 
Rohingya forced to flee their homes.”219 However, as of August 2018, the OIC had taken 
little concrete action toward these expressed objectives. 
ASEAN’s pronouncements toward the crisis have been nuanced. On 24 September 
2017, it condemned the attacks against the Myanmar’s military, but also supported the 
relief efforts for the Rohingya through their Coordinating Center for Humanitarian 
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Assistance.220 ASEAN, in keeping with the principles of the organization that guarantee 
“the right of every state to lead its national existence free from external interference, 
subversion of coercion” and “non-interference in the internal affairs of one another,” has 
done very little to pressure Myanmar to resolve the crisis or encourage action in any way.221 
Josh Kurlantzick, a senior fellow on the Council on Foreign Relations, summarizes, 
“[ASEAN member states] are not going to take a collective action on Myanmar, with 
Myanmar as one of its members. That is just the way ASEAN operates.”222 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter investigated the local and international response to the Rohingya crisis 
through the framework for refugee radicalization. The analysis presented in this chapter 
highlighted three major points that the RAND framework identifies as increasing the 
likelihood of radicalization of the Rohingya refugee population. First, Bangladesh’s efforts 
to support and secure the Rohingya face several challenges. The refugee camps are dense, 
some of the most concentrated camps in the world, which make managing and controlling 
them difficult. Furthermore, Bangladesh’s policies seek to protect their citizens and prevent 
the Rohingya from obtaining permanent residency in the country, which leaves the 
Rohingya with few choices for a future. Finally, the Rohingya are given few opportunities 
to be self-reliant. All of these points could lead to the radicalization of Rohingya refugees, 
as argued by the RAND framework. Second, financial donations are critical to aid in the 
relief effort and necessary to enact virtually all support programs. At the onset of the crisis, 
donations came in quickly, but as the crisis has dragged on and the cost of sustained 
response increased, there has been a shortfall in donations. This trend could continue for 
the Rohingya, and create the chance for other actors, such as militants or extremists, to 
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provide resources in their place. Lastly, the statements made by international actors and 
organizations toward the Rohingya have been inconsistent with their actions. Specifically, 
despite many statements accusing Myanmar of ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya, 
several international actors, including the United States, continue to maintain diplomatic 
ties with Myanmar. Others, such as Japan and India, continue robust economic 
development programs in Myanmar. 
The following chapter will model the conflict using game theory to show that the 
dominant strategy for both actors involves the use of violence, despite nonviolence being 
in both actors’ best interests. The chapter then will demonstrate a theoretical negotiated 
solution that ensures nonviolence, grants Rohingya citizenship, and fairly divides the 
contentious issues to the benefit of both actors. 
  
48 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
49 
IV. SECURING A PROMISE OF NONVIOLENCE 
Since the 1960s, the Rohingya in Myanmar have been the subject of five distinct 
waves of government and military-led persecution. As discussed in Chapter II, a critical 
component of this dispute is a disagreement over the origins of the Rohingya and their 
citizenship status in Myanmar. The Rohingya maintain that they are citizens of Myanmar, 
while Myanmar claims that they are illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, brought in during 
the British colonial period.223 
During the latest wave of persecution in 2016–2017, Myanmar forcibly displaced 
over 671,000 Rohingya to Bangladesh, where they added to the roughly 200,000 Rohingya 
refugees still in Bangladesh from the fourth wave of persecution. As described in Chapter 
III, the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh face an increased risk of radicalization due to 
restrictive policies of the Bangladeshi government, shortfalls in funding, and little 
international pressure on the government of Myanmar to change its policies and actions.224 
In May 2018, international actors and bilateral talks between Bangladesh and Myanmar 
attempted to begin the repatriation process, but short of a long-term solution to address the 
underlying issues, the cycle of violence and persecution will likely repeat itself.  
This chapter aims to model the Rohingya conflict in Myanmar using game theory 
to explore a fair solution for both players using the adjusted winner procedure.225 The 
chapter begins by describing each of the players in the game, the Rohingya and Myanmar. 
The chapter then describes the game, player strategies, and associated strategic moves of 
each player. The game demonstrates that the two players will always resort to violence 
unless the underlying facts used in the game are changed. The chapter then introduces and 
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applies an arbitration technique, known as the adjusted winner procedure, to fairly divide 
the contentious issues between the two players and secure a mutually beneficial outcome. 
A game theory approach finds that, even though nonviolence on the part of both 
players would be mutually beneficial, it is unlikely to occur without a mutual promise from 
both sides for nonviolence at the outset. A third-party arbiter is the best source for securing 
a mutual promise of nonviolence through a fair division of the contentious issues, resulting 
in citizenship for the Rohingya and stability in Rakhine State for Myanmar. 
A. THE ACTORS 
The game has two players: the Rohingya and Myanmar. Rohingya refers to the 
ethnic Muslims from Rakhine State in Myanmar who have undergone five major waves of 
persecution, as described in Chapter II. Currently, the largest population of Rohingya reside 
in refugee camps in the Cox’s Bazar district of Bangladesh, as described in Chapter III. 
The Rohingya lack a clear leader or group of leaders who can speak with authority 
on behalf of their entire population. As of 2018, the Rohingya have two potential groups 
that can negotiate on their behalf: ARSA, a nascent armed insurgent group responsible for 
guerrilla attacks on Myanmar security forces (previously known as Harakah Al-Yaqin); 
and the majhi system, a rudimentary form of self-government used in the refugee camps 
that was briefly discussed in Chapter III. Each of these groups will be described below. 
ARSA’s background and its organizational strength are not well known, but 
analysts believe it shares traits in common with previous Rohingya insurgent groups. An 
ICG report titled Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State, finds that, through 
interviews, a group of approximately 20 Rohingya immigrants living in Saudi Arabia 
formed ARSA in 2012.226 An ARSA spokesperson, Ata Ullah, who claimed responsibility 
for the 2017 guerilla attacks against the Myanmar military, was raised in Mecca where he 
received an Islamic education and became fluent in Arabic, in addition to speaking the 
Rohingya dialect of Bengali.227 The report goes on to claim that Ata Ullah and 
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approximately 20 other Rohingya gained guerilla warfare experience in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan before entering Rakhine State in 2013.228 Later in 2014, Ata Ullah and his 
counterparts formed a cadre who trained several hundred villagers from Rakhine State and 
organized them into a cellular structure to prevent detection.229 The report further claims 
that ARSA has ties to Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and possibly 
India.230 
ARSA conducted its first offensive operation in October 2016, when approximately 
300 men armed with machetes, knives, and slingshots attacked a border checkpoint in the 
northern region of the Rakhine State.231 ICG describes that the attack was a well-
coordinated raid with multiple phases including the use of an improvised explosive device 
and an ambush to delay reaction forces.232 The ICG further claims that the attack led to 
widespread fears and retaliation by local Buddhists and security forces.233 Security forces 
implemented area clearance operations in entire villages, attempting to cut the insurgents 
off from food, funds, recruits, and intelligence.234 Additionally, the Buddhists and security 
forces razed at least 1,500 Rohingya buildings, and the violence escalated to the point 
where security forces called in an attack helicopter that fired indiscriminately into villages 
and toward fleeing people, killing men, women, and children.235 ARSA claimed 
responsibility for the attacks on border checkpoints.236 
The following year, in August 2017, hundreds of ARSA insurgents carrying farm 
tools, sharp objects, and improvised explosive devices attacked 30 border checkpoints and 
one army base.237 Myanmar security forces swiftly and indiscriminately reacted, causing 
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the most recent forced migration of the Rohingya. Despite only attacking military targets, 
the ICG report predicts that the group’s tactics could transition to broader terrorist tactics 
if the Rohingya grievances remain unresolved.238 
ARSA has not adopted an overtly religious tone. However, local Islamic clerics and 
those in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia have 
issued fatwas that endorse their cause.239 The fatwas declare that, due to the persecution of 
the Muslim communities in the Rakhine State, the violent opposition to Myanmar security 
forces is legal under the rule of Islam.240 
ARSA offers strengths and limits as the potential representative of the Rohingya. 
First, they have established support from some Rohingya civilians, including village elders 
who said they were “impressed by their dedication, sincerity and strong commitment to 
their cause.”241 Additionally, ARSA has financial support from Rohingya living abroad, 
including several private contributors from the Middle East, specifically Saudi Arabia.242 
However, even though ARSA claims they do not have international jihadist objectives, 
they have been branded as a terrorist organization with links to international jihadist groups 
including Pakistan’s Lashkar-e-Taiba.243 Finally, ARSA could be influenced to change 
their operational objectives and continue violent attacks due to their external funding 
sources and if violence toward Rohingya continues from the Myanmar military.244 
The second group, the majhi, are an ad hoc form of governance in Rohingya refugee 
camps in Bangladesh. The majhi provide a method for the Rohingya to voice their 
humanitarian concerns and to provide some resources, such as basic security. The system 
also establishes a rudimentary governmental structure in the camps and a structure to 
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coordinate with Bangladeshi and humanitarian officials.245 The majhi system has three tiers 
of representation that range from 50–200 households to entire camps.246 Despite 
considerable success in providing a degree of organization for the Rohingya, the majhi 
system also has suffered challenges and has experienced corruption and misconduct.247 
Furthermore, the majhi system may not be able to sufficiently voice the concerns of the 
Rohingya because they are subordinate to Bangladeshi officials who may marginalize them 
to advance the goals of Bangladesh.248 It is unclear how their leadership will develop in 
the future. 
The second player is Myanmar, which includes both the government and military 
of the country. The Union of Myanmar has a complicated relationship between its 
government and the military. The military ruled the country from 1958 until 2010. 
In 2011, a newly elected democratic government came to power, but the military retained 
significant influence under the new government structure. Specifically, the military is 
constitutionally guaranteed 25 percent of the seats in the legislature, three influential union 
ministry positions (defense, border affairs, and home affairs), and a clause that permits 
them to assume power in a “state of emergency.”249 Aung San Suu Kyi and her party, the 
National League for Democracy, won the election in 2015, but she was constitutionally 
barred from becoming president. Instead, the government created a new position for her, 
State Counselor, which carries with it the responsibilities of a head of state but lacks 
direct control over the military.250 Therefore, while Myanmar is ostensibly a democratic 
country with a civilian head of state, the military retains substantial autonomy and decision 
authority with regard to operations. Despite the separate authorities that exist between the 
military and civilian government, the game will treat Myanmar as a unified actor. 
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B. THE GAME 
This chapter will model the game between Myanmar and the Rohingya as a 
sequential, two-person, partial conflict game, with two strategies available to each player. 
Partial conflict differs from zero-sum in that players can benefit from cooperation, but the 
cooperation may be unstable. Playing the game sequentially permits an analysis of whether 
or not a player has a first-move advantage over the other player. The two strategies 
available to each player are violence or nonviolence and are described in further detail 
below. 
First, the violence strategy for Myanmar is defined as Myanmar using any amount 
of force against the ethnic Rohingya. This strategy also includes denying the Rohingya 
rights to citizenship and claims of land ownership. The game assumes that a strategy of 
violence enables the government to maintain popularity among their political base, which 
are overwhelmingly against ethnic Rohingya Muslims.251 However, this strategy costs 
the government its standing in the international community. The UN, major world powers, 
and numerous other international organizations have repeatedly condemned the actions 
of the Myanmar government, and the strongest condemnations have characterized the 
government’s behavior as “ethnic cleansing.”252 Up to this point, much of the international 
response has been in the form of statements, as described in Chapter III, but future reactions 
could involve sanctions or outright intervention. Additionally, this strategy is economically 
taxing due to the costs of sustained military operations and a decrease in the labor force 
while attempting to route the Rohingya.253 
A nonviolence strategy is defined as Myanmar refraining from the use of force 
against the Rohingya. Furthermore, this strategy includes the Myanmar government 
recognizing the Rohingya as citizens of the state. If the government executes this strategy, 
they will likely lose popular support within the country, which could prompt protests or 
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demonstrations by individuals and groups who feel the government should not recognize 
the Rohingya as citizens. Protests and demonstrations could destabilize the country more 
than the instability caused by expelling Rohingya from Rakhine State. However, Myanmar 
would gain credibility in the international community and would likely receive praise for 
seeking a nonviolent solution. Furthermore, a nonviolence strategy would eliminate the 
possibility of international intervention and would promote the country’s standing in the 
international community. 
For the Rohingya, a strategy of violence is defined as carrying out attacks against 
the Myanmar government, military, and its citizens. The goal of this violence would be to 
coerce the Myanmar government into granting the Rohingya citizenship and recognizing 
their claims to land in the Rakhine State. ARSA and other predecessors have used this 
strategy in the past albeit unsuccessfully; none of the movements gained enough support 
to sway the opinion of the Myanmar government. The risks associated with this strategy 
are more violence against the Rohingya and loss of credibility in the international 
community. However, this strategy does give the Rohingya a way of fighting back against 
the government and its persecution. If the Rohingya obtain outside support and resources, 
and greater support from its own population, this strategy could become sustainable over 
time. 
A strategy of nonviolence for the Rohingya is defined as using nonviolent protest, 
appeals to the international community, and any other nonviolent means to obtain 
citizenship in Myanmar and recognition of their claims to land in Rakhine State. 
Nonviolence allows the Rohingya to retain the moral high ground when compared to the 
actions taken by Myanmar and it gives them greater moral leverage when dealing with the 
international community. However, this strategy leaves the Rohingya vulnerable to 
persecution and widespread violence from the state, as the world witnessed in August 2017. 
The game assumes that, while many take the strategy of nonviolence, if a few Rohingya 
adopt a strategy of violence, the nonviolent Rohingya will suffer the same persecution as 
the violent Rohingya at the hands of the Myanmar government. 
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C. ANALYSIS OF THE GAME 
The game is played between the government of Myanmar and the Rohingya as a 
two-person partial conflict game, with two strategies available to each player as depicted 
in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Strategic Options 
The game produces four possible results: 
1. AC: Myanmar uses violence; Rohingya use violence 
2. AD: Myanmar uses violence; Rohingya use nonviolence 
3. BC: Myanmar uses nonviolence; Rohingya use violence 
4. BD: Myanmar uses nonviolence; Rohingya use nonviolence 
The following assumptions are built into the game. First, both players are rational 
actors because one must assume rationality to gauge the impacts of strategic moves 
accurately. Second, both players are pursuing a maximin strategy.254 Given these 
assumptions, the outcomes are rank-ordered for each player in Table 2 and 3. 
 
 
                                                 
254 A maximin strategy is played by an actor that seeks to limit risk by selecting the strategy that 
guarantees the maximum of the minimum payoffs. 
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Table 2. Myanmar Options Ranked 
 
Table 3. Rohingya Options Ranked 
 
This game, in other words, produces the same results as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, a 
game that illustrates the challenges of securing cooperation from two players when the 
rational choice is to not cooperate. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, cooperation by both players 
can yield a better payoff for each player, but this position is unstable and the incentive for 
either player to cheat is high. The Nash Equilibrium is stable, as neither player can improve 
their payoff unilaterally, and occurs when both players cheat but yields a lower payoff for 
each player than cooperation. The game and the Nash Equilibrium are illustrated in Figure 
5. 
4—Best: Myanmar uses violence; Rohingya use nonviolence 
 
3—Myanmar uses nonviolence; Rohingya use nonviolence 
 
2—Myanmar uses violence; Rohingya use violence 
 
1—Worst: Myanmar uses nonviolence; Rohingya use violence 
4—Best: Rohingya use violence; Myanmar uses nonviolence 
 
3—Rohingya use nonviolence; Myanmar uses nonviolence 
 
2—Rohingya use violence; Myanmar uses violence 
 
1—Worst: Rohingya use nonviolence; Myanmar uses violence 
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Figure 5. The Rohingya Crisis Prisoner’s Dilemma 
The game above highlights several key challenges for achieving a positive outcome 
between the Rohingya and the government of Myanmar. For both sides, the best outcome 
is to use violence to achieve their goals while the other side uses nonviolence. If both sides 
use nonviolence, the outcome is preferable to both sides using violence, yet the need to 
guard against cheating inevitably leads both sides to the Nash Equilibrium, outcome AC, 
or both sides using violence to achieve their goals. The question that remains is: what 
strategic moves are available to the players to improve their scores?  
Given the above dynamic, it is important to break down the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
and analyze each move sequentially: 
• A will represent Myanmar using violence 
• B will represent Myanmar using nonviolence 
• C will represent the Rohingya using violence 
• D will represent the Rohingya using nonviolence 
• Myanmar has a dominant strategy: use violence 
• The Rohingya have a dominant strategy: use violence 
• A Nash Equilibrium exists at AC (2,2) in a pure strategy game 
• Without communication the outcome is (2,2) 
• With communication, we can determine if either side has a first move 
advantage. 
Violence Nonviolence
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First, Myanmar’s strategic moves are as follows: 
• If Myanmar does A, then the Rohingya do C, resulting in (2,2) 
• If Myanmar does B, then the Rohingya do C, resulting in (1,4) 
• Myanmar would choose (2,2) 
If Myanmar forces the Rohingya to move first: 
• If the Rohingya do C, then Myanmar does A, resulting in (2,2) 
• If the Rohingya do D, then Myanmar does A, resulting in (4,1) 
• The Rohingya would choose (2,2) 
No matter which player moves first, the game ends up at the Nash Equilibrium of 
(2,2). Therefore, neither player can gain an advantage by seizing the first move. 
Second, can a threat improve the score? For a threat to work, it has to reduce the 
payoff to both the issuer of the threat and the recipient of the threat. The optimal outcome 
for Myanmar is for the Rohingya to choose D. Therefore, Myanmar would issue a threat 
on C. If the Rohingya choose C, Myanmar must threaten to do B. However, while BC hurts 
Myanmar, it gives the Rohingya their best payoff, (4). Therefore, Myanmar does not have 
a threat. 
Because this game is symmetrical, the same logic would follow that the Rohingya 
also does not have a threat. The optimal outcome for Rohingya is for Myanmar to choose 
B. Therefore, the Rohingya would issue a threat on A. If Myanmar chooses A, the 
Rohingya must threaten to do D. As before, while AD hurts the Rohingya, it gives 
Myanmar its best score. Therefore, the Rohingya do not have a threat either. 
Finally, could either side improve its score with a promise? For a promise to work, 
it has to reduce the payoff to the issuer of the promise while increasing the payoff to the 
recipient. As with a threat, the optimal outcome for Myanmar is for the Rohingya to choose 
D. Therefore, Myanmar must issue a promise on D. If the Rohingya choose D, Myanmar 
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promises to choose B. This removes AD from the game and results in (3,3) which is an 
improvement over the Nash Equilibrium of (2,2). In other words, Myanmar does have a 
promise. Similarly, the optimal outcome for the Rohingya is for Myanmar to choose B. 
Therefore, the Rohingya must issue a promise on B. If Myanmar chooses B, the Rohingya 
promise to choose D. This removes BC from the game and results in (3,3). The Rohingya, 
therefore, also have a promise. 
From an analysis of strategic moves, it becomes clear that only with a promise from 
both sides can the game move from the Nash Equilibrium of violence begetting violence 
to the increased payoff of mutual nonviolence at BD. How can these two sides, who have 
an extensive mutual distrust of each other, produce these promises and stick to them? 
D. ARBITRATED SOLUTION THROUGH ADJUSTED WINNER 
PROCEDURE 
Several different methods will meet the conditions that will allow both sides to 
make a promise and to enforce their delivery. One mechanism is arbitrated negotiation, 
such as by the UN or another third party. The adjusted winner procedure is a recently 
developed method that involves both players assigning a numerical value to the issues that 
are available for negotiation based on the level of importance that they place on obtaining 
each one.255 For this scenario, the topics are: 
• Citizenship—the desire of the Rohingya to be recognized by Myanmar as 
natural citizens, which is currently prevented by the 1982 citizenship law 
• Autonomous Muslim region—beginning in 1946, the Rohingya leadership 
petitioned for a semi-autonomous region for their people that would 
remain part of Myanmar 
• Release of political prisoners—The Rohingya want the release of all their 
people that Myanmar has imprisoned. 
                                                 
255 Consortium for Mathematics and Its Applications (U.S.), ed., For All Practical Purposes: 
Mathematical Literacy in Today’s World, Tenth edition (New York: W.H. Freeman & Company, 2016), 
490. 
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• International support—Myanmar wants international support to stimulate 
economic growth and development. The Rohingya need international 
support to re-establish communities that have been destroyed by 
Myanmar. 
• Mandated delegate count in parliament—The Rohingya would require a 
minimum required delegate count, similar to how the military currently 
has the right to appoint 25% of the seats in parliament. 
The issues are listed in Table 4 with the players’ theoretical weight assigned to each 
issue. Importantly, the weights for each player must sum to 100. The arbiter then awards 
the issues to each player based on which player weighted a given issue the highest. In this 
example, Myanmar would be granted authority over the autonomous region and would 
receive international support. The Rohingya would be granted a minimum mandated 
delegate count and secure the release of Rohingya political prisoners held by Myanmar. 
Table 4. Adjusted Winner Procedure Point Allocations 
Myanmar Issue Rohingya 
40 Citizenship for Rohingya 50 
35 Semi-autonomous Region 20 
5 Political Prisoners 10 







While the arbiter can easily apportion four of the topics to the players, the topic of 
citizenship would need to be split to ensure a fair division of the topic that both players 
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value the most. Equation 1 depicts the resulting equation after dividing the topics, where 
{x = portion citizenship to Rohingya} and {(1-x) = portion citizenship to Myanmar}. 
 50 40(1 ) 25 50( )x x+ − = +  (1) 
 After solving Equation 1 for x, the portion of citizenship for each player is shown 
in Equation 2. 
 
65Portion Citizenship to Rohingya   or 72%
90





 These fractions are then verified for a fair distribution for each player, which is 
depicted in Equation 3. 
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= + = +
= =  (3) 
The equations confirm that each player received an equal share of citizenship, based 
on the theoretical value each player assigned to citizenship. Simply, the percentages 
indicate that a decision on the citizenship topic must significantly favor the Rohingya, 
meaning they widely obtain citizenship while Myanmar retains some control over how the 
law is written. However, it is difficult to define 28% citizenship for Myanmar and 72% 
citizenship for Rohingya. 
One method of solving this problem could involve parsing out the topic of 
citizenship to subtopics, each player assigning new values to each subtopic, and then 
attempting to reach a settlement of subtopics that is in line with 28% to Myanmar and 
72% to Rohingya. Alternatively, the Rohingya could grant Myanmar a conditional 
citizenship that Myanmar values at 28%. For example, the two players could negotiate how 
far back a Rohingya must trace their residency to claim citizenship. While the Rohingya 
would likely push to have a much more favorable interpretation, for example, one 
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generation, Myanmar would most likely push for five generations to restrict the citizenship 
claim. The Rohingya could grant Myanmar a two-generation minimum, which could fulfill 
part of the 28% to Myanmar. 
Ultimately, these compromises would require a third-party guarantor to build trust 
between the Rohingya and the Myanmar government and ensure compliance. Chapter III 
discussed three types of external actors in the Myanmar-Rohingya conflict: regional states; 
international states; and IOs, including ASEAN. From the discussion in Chapter III, the 
following actors could provide a credible guarantor: Japan, the United States, or the UN. 
Japan would be the preferred guarantor. Japan is a supporter of Myanmar and invests 
heavily in the country but uses its influence to encourage democratic reforms and is in line 
with U.S. policy. Additionally, Japan is the second largest government donor to the 
Rohingya relief efforts and an outspoken supporter of the voluntary and safe repatriation 
and resettlement of the Rohingya, which is in line with UN objectives.256 By being an 
advocate for both parties, Japan could avoid allegations of bias and ensure both parties 
adhere to the terms of the compromise.  
Alternatively, the United States could guarantee the compromise but does not 
have a well-developed relationship with the government of Myanmar compared to Japan. 
The UN would be a credible guarantor and could create a committee to oversee the 
compromise that includes a variety of independent authorities. China, Russia, and India 
would be inappropriate guarantors due to their vocal bias toward the government of 
Myanmar. Likewise, ASEAN and any of its member states would be a poor choice as a 
guarantor because of its principle of nonintervention in the affairs of member states and 
historical inaction.257 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter modeled the Rohingya refugee crisis using game theory and found that 
the relationship between the Rohingya and the government of Myanmar is most like the 
                                                 
256 Japan Times Online, “Foreign Minister Taro Kono Urges Suu Kyi to Ensure Safe Return of 
Rohingya Refugees.” 
257 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “About ASEAN.” 
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classic game of Prisoner’s Dilemma. Both players can maximize their payoff from mutual 
nonviolence but will not pursue this strategy without a mutual promise. Lacking a mutual 
promise, both players will revert to violence and end up diminishing their payoff. Thus, 
the chapter illustrated how a mutual promise could be secured through the use of the 
adjusted winner procedure and a third-party guarantor to fairly divide the issues depending 
on how much value the players assigned to each issue. 
As of May 2018, the violence against the Rohingya subsided somewhat, and 
attempts are being made to repatriate the Rohingya from Bangladesh to Myanmar. 
However, the underlying issues of citizenship and regional autonomy for the Rohingya 
have not been addressed, which makes another wave of persecution by Myanmar likely. 
The international community should seize this opportunity to bring both actors to 
negotiations and resolve the issues to achieve a lasting solution. 
The next chapter will offer summary thoughts of the Rohingya crisis and possible 
next steps for regional actors and the international community. 
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V. SUMMARY 
The Rohingya have suffered five major waves of persecution since 1962, resulting 
in hundreds of thousands of Rohingya being forcibly displaced from Rakhine State. The 
most recent wave of violence, which began in 2016, forced over 600,000 Rohingya across 
the border into Bangladesh and quickly became a significant humanitarian crisis due to the 
overwhelming numbers, the speed at which it occurred, and the lack of infrastructure to 
support the influx of refugees. Furthermore, the massive forced migration and protracted 
persecution of the Rohingya raised concerns about the potential for radicalization of this 
group, especially in Bangladesh. 
This thesis aimed to examine the following questions: What are the conditions that 
have caused the repeated incidents of forced migration of Rohingya from the country of 
Myanmar? Given the repeated incidents of discrimination and forced migration, what is 
the likelihood that the Muslim minority will become radicalized? And, what are the 
conditions that would allow Myanmar and the Rohingya to reach an agreement that 
decreases the likelihood of future incidents of forced migration? 
This thesis aimed to answer these questions through a mixture of three different 
methods. First, it examined these questions through the use of qualitative methods, 
specifically by providing a historic overview of the Rohingya, the state of Myanmar, and 
the waves of forced migration. Second, it used visual analytic techniques to display critical 
risk factors for radicalization, specifically analyzing the size and density of refugee camps 
in Bangladesh, the source of financial donations to the Rohingya crisis and mapping the 
international community’s inconsistent behavior regarding the crisis. Third, it used game 
theory to model the conflict between the Rohingya and Myanmar in order to determine the 
dominant strategy for each actor and explore ways to achieve a mutual agreement. 
This thesis applied these methods to the research questions in three substantive 
chapters. Chapter II examined the history of the Rohingya people, with an emphasis on the 
competing narratives that exist regarding their origins and citizenship in Myanmar. The 
chapter underscored that Myanmar’s unwillingness to recognize the Rohingya as an ethnic 
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minority group and grant them citizenship has been a critical driver of violence during the 
twentieth century. Chapter II further identified five waves of persecution of Rohingya by 
the government and Tatmadaw (1963–1967, 1971–1979, 1988–1992, 2012–2013, and 
2016–2017). The three most recent waves of forced migration stem from the citizenship 
law of 1982, which fully denied the Rohingya citizenship in Myanmar. 
Chapter III relied heavily on a framework developed by the RAND Corporation for 
assessing the risk of refugee radicalization to investigate the likelihood of the Rohingya 
radicalizing in the most recent wave of forced migration, which began in 2016. 
Specifically, it focused on Bangladesh’s policies toward the refugees, international 
financial support to the crisis, and public statements made by regional and international 
actors. The chapter identified Bangladesh’s restrictive laws toward the Rohingya refugee 
population as potential contributors to the radicalization of this vulnerable population. 
Furthermore, humanitarian relief efforts are underfunded, which affects virtually all efforts 
to aid the refugees in Bangladesh, also increasing the risk of radicalization. Using visual 
analytics, the chapter highlighted the camp locations and density, funding sources from 
regional and international actors, and their public statements regarding the crisis, noting 
that most countries are condemning of Myanmar, but continue to do business with the 
government, reducing pressure on Myanmar to change its policies 
Chapter IV modeled the Rohingya conflict using game theory, specifically a two-
person, partial conflict game and found that both players—the Rohingya and the 
government of Myanmar (including its military)—can maximize their payoff through 
mutual nonviolence. However, this payoff would also require a mutual “promise” not to 
pursue violence, which could be achieved through a negotiated agreement over the 
contentious issues, namely citizenship and regional autonomy for the Rohingya. In order 
to ensure both side’s compliance with the agreement, the chapter explored the use of a 
third-party guarantor. Drawing from Chapter III, it identified Japan, the UN, and the United 
States as possible candidates, given their support of both the government of Myanmar and 
the Rohingya refugees. 
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A. FINDINGS 
This investigation yielded three findings regarding the potential for the Rohingya 
to radicalize as a result of its chronic persecution. First, an examination of the history of 
the Rohingya showed that their claimed origins and time of arrival in the region drastically 
differ from the belief held by the government of Myanmar regarding the issue and prevents 
their willful acceptance as citizens. The Rohingya claim a pre-colonial history and a unique 
identity from Bangladeshis, despite sharing the same religion and speaking the same 
language. The government of Myanmar, by contrast, views the Rohingya as illegal 
immigrants brought in from Bangladesh by the British. This fundamental disagreement has 
contributed to the continued government persecution of the Rohingya, including five waves 
of forced migration. This perpetual continued persecution of the Rohingya could make the 
ethnic group more vulnerable to radicalization. 
Second, the RAND refugee radicalization framework revealed that the most recent 
wave of forced migration, which began in 2016, has placed the Rohingya refugees in 
Bangladesh at increased risk of future radicalization. Specifically, Bangladesh’s restrictive 
policies toward the Rohingya, limited humanitarian aid and funding, and the lack of 
pressure put on the government of Myanmar by regional and international actors are all 
factors that increase the risk of radicalization. Additionally, the RAND report notes that 
time plays a critical role in the risk of radicalization. As of August 2018, the most recent 
crisis is beginning its second year, and several other cases of forced migration have become 
worse over time. As the RAND report demonstrates, the Afghan refugees in Pakistan 
(1978–1988) are an example of how the international community failed to act in a manner 
that could have prevented the radicalization of large portions of the refugee population and 
stem the violence that occurred for many years following the conclusion of the crisis.258 
If Bangladesh and the international community do not properly manage this refugee crisis, 
it has the potential to be a high-risk for radicalization. 
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Furthermore, a few Rohingya have already demonstrated a willingness to use 
violence to achieve political ends. Specifically, the emergence of the ARSA in 2017 is a 
troubling development. ARSA was largely blamed for instigating the fifth wave of 
persecution against the Rohingya after perpetrating an attack against over 30 Myanmar 
border checkpoints and an army base. ARSA has conducted only a few operations since 
2017 and its total organizational strength is not well known, but it has demonstrated a 
moderate level of lethality that is worth noting. Despite the efforts of Bangladesh to 
increase security among the Rohingya in its country, there are signs that ARSA has 
developed a presence in the camps. While the fluid nature of the crisis has made measuring 
the presence of ARSA in the camps all but impossible, the 900,000 refugees in Bangladesh 
provides a vulnerable population from which to recruit. Additionally, while ARSA has 
not adopted an overtly religious tone, the organization traces its origins to refugees in 
Saudi Arabia, and Islamic clerics in several countries have issued fatwas that endorse 
their cause.259 
Third, a resolution to the crisis is possible if both sides come to an agreed 
understanding of citizenship for the Rohingya. For example, both parties could negotiate 
how far back a Rohingya must trace their residency to claim citizenship. While the 
Rohingya would likely push to have a much more favorable interpretation, for example, 
one generation, Myanmar would most likely push for five generations to restrict the 
citizenship claim. However, one of the major challenges to a negotiated agreement is that 
neither side is a unified actor. This is especially true of the Rohingya, who do not have a 
clear leader or organization that can speak with authority on behalf of their entire 
population. Myanmar also does not operate as a unified actor; it is a fledgling democracy 
with a civilian head of state; however the military retains substantial autonomy and 
decision authority with regard to governance. 
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As of August 2018, the wave of violence against the Rohingya has subsided, and 
Bangladesh and Myanmar have signed an agreement to repatriate the Rohingya from 
Bangladesh to Myanmar, although virtually no Rohingya have yet to return. Furthermore, 
neither side has addressed the underlying issues of citizenship and the rights of 
Rohingya in Myanmar, which makes another wave of persecution by the government and 
military probable. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
These findings yield the following recommendations for regional and international 
actors concerned with preventing the Rohingya from radicalizing: 
International aid matters. First, international aid stems the tide of desperation 
among a displaced population. In the case of the Rohingya, the donations of the 
international community have provided the refugees with basic necessities and helped 
avoid prolonged suffering. However, as Chapter III illustrated, not enough aid has been 
given to provide for the more than 900,000 Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, and aid is 
likely to decrease as the crisis persists. 
As of May 2018, monetary support to the Rohingya relief effort came 
overwhelmingly from Western powers and Japan. Despite their proximity, ASEAN 
countries have donated very little to support the Rohingya, which may be due in part to 
their alliances with Myanmar and the economic mandate of the organization. As the crisis 
enters its second year, the relief effort is already underfunded and the cost to support the 
Rohingya in camps in Bangladesh will persist as the crisis remains unresolved. With the 
current response already flagging, donor fatigue becomes a significant concern for what 
will likely be a protracted refugee crisis. 
The international community should continue to provide financial support—
including the United States, which is the single largest donor of financial aid—despite the 
fact that donations alone will not provide a lasting solution. As the RAND framework for 
assessing risk of refugee radicalization notes, crowded camps with unsanitary conditions, 
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food scarcity, and limited resources increase the risk of radicalization.260 Donations can 
mitigate these factors and every effort should be made to sustain donor contributions. 
Rohingya radicalization is still possible. As of August 2018, ARSA is the only 
insurgent opposition to Myanmar persecution. As described in Chapters II and VI, ARSA 
has chosen guerilla tactics against the security forces of Myanmar as its principal means of 
protest. The group has demonstrated a limited but capable ability to conduct coordinated 
surprise attacks against checkpoints and army bases in Myanmar. While it appears that the 
majority of Rohingya do not sympathize with ARSA and may even blame the nascent 
organization for the 2016–2017 wave of forced migration, the RAND framework suggests 
that, without any chance of an improved life, more Rohingya may resort to violence and 
insurgency in an attempt to change the status quo. The international community should 
apply additional pressure on Myanmar to settle the grievances of the Rohingya, allow for 
safe repatriation, and make some of them citizens. 
As of 2018, ARSA targeted Myanmar, particularly its military, as a means of 
putting pressure on the government to change its policies. However, their actions could 
expand to other targets, namely Bangladesh. Bangladesh has chosen to implement 
restrictive policies against the Rohingya and, coupled with other forms of discrimination, 
ARSA’s violence could include targeting people and the government in Bangladesh. 
Therefore, finding a more lasting resolution to this crisis and preventing the Rohingya from 
radicalizing should be a regional and international concern. 
Repatriation alone is unlikely to resolve the problem. The 2018 solution to the 
Rohingya refugee crisis in Bangladesh is to repatriate the refugees to Myanmar. However, 
this solution has two significant shortcomings. First, many of the Rohingya do not feel safe 
returning to Myanmar. For example, Rohingya refugees told reporters from Al Jazeera in 
2018 that “they would rather stay and die in Bangladesh rather than go back to Myanmar 
if there is no Rohingya recognition, government compensation and reparations, and more 
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inclusivity in government services.”261 Therefore, requiring the Rohingya to repatriate may 
go against their wishes and be another form of forced migration. 
Second, repatriation is unlikely to work because it does little to resolve the 
underlying issues that have caused the violence over the preceding century. Regional and 
international actors have not forced Myanmar to change any of their discriminatory policies 
that render the Rohingya stateless and limits many aspects of their lives. Myanmar restricts 
whom the Rohingya can marry, how many children they may have, and where they are 
allowed to reside.262 Myanmar refuses to recognize the Rohingya as an ethnic group and 
grant them citizenship, instead choosing to refer to them as “Bengalis.”263 Repatriation of 
the Rohingya to a country that continues to treat them in this way portends another wave 
of violence. 
The international community could encourage Bangladesh to create a path to 
citizenship for the Rohingya, which would enable the Rohingya to leave the refugee camps 
and begin to rebuild their lives, increase self-reliance, restore self-worth, and ultimately 
might prevent a radical group from exploiting the population. However, the government of 
Bangladesh does not support this idea. When asked about the assimilations of the Rohingya 
in Bangladesh, Shahriar Alam, Bangladesh’s state minister of foreign affairs, responded, 
“no, there is no such plan because Bangladesh is already the most densely populated on 
Earth. We strongly believe they (Rohingya) belong to Myanmar…[Citizenship] is not an 
issue we should be dealing with.”264 
Bangladesh and the international community should pressure Myanmar to confer 
citizenship on the Rohingya. This policy would address the core grievance of the Rohingya, 
defuse ARSA, and provide the trust that is necessary to begin repatriation. However, 
conferring citizenship on the Rohingya is not a panacea. Myanmar could find other ways 
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to marginalize the Rohingya while recognizing their citizenship status, but citizenship 
would be an encouraging step toward reconciliation. It would then be up to the international 
community to continue to encourage democratic reforms and human rights while 
admonishing inappropriate behavior by this developing democracy. Without a path to 
citizenship in Myanmar, the Rohingya will continue to be the largest stateless ethnic group 
in the world. 
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